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ABSTACT
Territorial privacy, one of the central categories of privacy protection, involves setting
limit boundaries on intrusion into an explicit space or locale. Initially, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which defined the privacy tort of intrusion, as applied by courts, most
notably designated two classes of excluded areas: “private” places in which the
individual can expect to be free from intrusion, and “non-private” places, in which the
individual does not have a recognized expectation of privacy. In the physical world,
courts ultimately held almost uniformly that the tort of intrusion could not occur in a
public place or in a place that may be viewed from a public place.
Cyberspace, on the other hand, was not left with a public sphere nor has a balanced
territorial privacy policy so far been established. Instead, based on the category of
database privacy protection, only a private privacy legal rule was adopted and too
widely so. One of the main explanations for this anomaly, in fact, derives from
cyberspace’s unique architecture. While the physical world is subject to a default rule of
a continuous public sphere that is then subject to distinct proprietary private sphere
allotments; Cyberspace architecture, on the other hand, imbeds a different structure. In
the latter, apart from the Internet’s “public roads” or backbone transit infrastructure,
which is distinctly regulated according to telecommunications and antitrust law, the
present default rule contains a mosaic of private allotments – namely, neighboring
proprietary web sites.
This anomaly is even more acute given that the U.S government, the FTC and
theoreticians alike, thus far, have developed neither comprehensive nor supportive
boundary theory that could maintain territorial privacy. All three, instead, have implicitly
or explicitly only considered technocentristic boundary approaches. From a legal
perspective the factual truths or scientific hypothesis underlying the existence of on-line
spatiality, as discussed notably in the works of Johnson and Post, Lessig, Hunter, Lemley
and others, should, instead, be only a parameter in establishing legal truth. In
compliance with what is an alternative localist boundary approach, this study suggests
that law, indeed, could construct a legal fiction of on-line locales, through which
territorial privacy, ultimately, could be integrated into cyberspace privacy policy at
large.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A. Information privacy: The imperfect vision for computer-related privacy
Privacy has always been a challenging legal concept and is difficult to define.1 No bright
line rule indicates whether an expectation of privacy is constitutionally reasonable.2 The
concept of privacy has no single interest, but rather has several different dimensions or
categories that are not just observed but also legally constructed. The concept of privacy
can generally be divided into four categories.3 The first is bodily privacy, which
addresses issues related to the physical integrity of the individual against invasive
procedures through the tort of trespass to the person. Law, originally, provided a remedy
solely for physical interference with the life and property of the individual.4 The second
is privacy of communications, which relates to the First Amendment's freedom of speech
and association, where an individual is granted the right to communicate freely among
peers.5 It covers the various interests of individuals in communicating among themselves
using various forms of communications. The third is information privacy, which concerns
the control and handling of personal data.6 The constitutional right to information privacy
is a derivative of the Supreme Court's substantive due process "right to privacy" cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut7 and Roe v. Wade.8 The fourth, and the focal point of
* © 2004 Daniel Benoliel
** J.S.D. candidate UC Berkeley, School of Law & Internet Society Project (ISP) visiting Fellow,
Yale Law School. This study was funded by the Informational Technology Research (ITR)
research grant, University of California at Berkeley, The Center for Information Technology
Research in the Interest of Society (CITRIS). A version of this study also won the prize best
student article competition in the Fourteenth Annual Computers, Freedom & Privacy Conference.
For their most helpful comments and support, I am indebted to Pamela Samuelson, Mark Lemley,
David Post, Dan Hunter, Julie Cohen, Edward Soja, Orin Kerr, the Chief Scientist of CITRIS James Demmel and David Wagner. Any inaccuracies are my responsibility. For further questions
or comments, please email me at: Daniel_b@berkeley.edu.
1
See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 422 (1980); Julie C.
Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 3 (1992); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1967); Raymond T. Nimmer, Information Law, Privacy Right vs. Public
Right (November 2001), ¶ 8:31.
2
See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). See discussion herein.
3
See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Id, at 433; Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet: Whose
Information is it Anyway?, 38 Jurimetrics 565, 566-67 (1998). See, discussion herein.
4
As early as 1891, the Supreme Court declared: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person”. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). See, also, Morris L. Ernst
& Alan U. Schwartz, Privacy: The Right to Be Let Alone 47 (1962); Tom Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233 (1977), at 266 & n.119.
5
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); U.S. v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th
Cir. 1998); Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 216-17 (5th Cir. 2001).
6
Ruth Gavison, supra not 1, at 433; Posner defines it as an individual's "right to conceal
discreditable facts about himself.” Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 46 (5th ed.
1998); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 272-73 (1981).
7
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
8
410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this landmark privacy case, the Court upheld that the right of privacy
includes the right to make one's own decisions about activities related to marriage, procreation,
contraception, abortion, family relationships, and education, or a subsidiary category of privacy,
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this study, is territorial privacy, which involves setting limit boundaries on intrusion into
an explicit space or locale.9 Turning our focus from disruptions to the practices, which
they disrupt, we often refer to aspects of these practices as "private matters." In other
words, we say that certain things, places, and affairs are “private.”10 Initially, Courts
designated two classes of excluded areas: “private” areas, as a home,11 or a reserved hotel
room,12 in which the individual can expect to be free from governmental intrusion13 and
“non-private” areas, in which the individual does not have a recognized expectation of
privacy.14 The designation of an area as “private” protected the personal information
located there from intrusion and governmental seizure. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts most notably incorporated these views into the comments to section 652B, 15 which
defines the privacy tort of intrusion.16 Thus, Courts held almost uniformly that the tort of
intrusion could not occur in a public place or in a place that may be viewed from a public
place.17 On a public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right to

9

10

11

12
13
14
15

16

17

known as ‘decisional privacy’. See, also, Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977), where using a
spatial metaphor, Court reaffirmed that constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" jointly
protected he "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”, with the individual's
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”. Id. at 599-600.
In boundary theory, the terms ‘space’, ‘locale’ and ‘sphere’ or ‘area’, have separate spatial
meanings that would be distinguished later on. See discussion, in Part II, herein.
See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960), at 390-91; Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, Calif. L. Rev. 1087 (2002), at 1130 [Hereinafter, ‘Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy’]. See, also, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 11-13, 75-77 (Norton ed. 1975)
(emphasizing public and private locales).
Clinton v. Commonwealth, 130 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 1963), rev'd, Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158
(1964)).
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
Id.
For an exception recognizing a cause of action of privacy intrusion in the public sphere, see,
Restatement (Second) of Torts, (1977) (Intrusion Upon Seclusion) (Current through July 2002), §
652B cmt. c., see, also, illus. 7.; 2. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964);
Andrew Jay Mcclurg, Bringing privacy law out of the closet: A tort theory of liability for
intrusions in public places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989 (1995), at 1045-1055 (upholding “public privacy”
paradigm and a tortuous cause of action).
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B cmt. c. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B
defines as a tort the intrusion into the seclusion of an individual. It is intended to protect against
intrusions, physical or otherwise, "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. Courts in at
least twenty-eight states and Federal Government have explicitly or implicitly recognize this
privacy tort and adhere to the definitions offered in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B652E (1977). See, W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), at
851 (5th ed. 1984); Reporter’s Notes” for the list of practically all states and Federal Government
upholding the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B Tort of Invasion.
See, also W. Page Keeton et al., Id, § 117, at 855-56; William L. Prosser, supra note 9, at 391-92;
Andrew Jay Mcclurg, supra note 14, p. 1025; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, Taking Unauthorized Photographs
as Invasion of Privacy (ed. Phillip E. Hassman), § 2. See, also e.g., Hartman v. Meredith Corp.,
638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1116-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986);
Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963); Foster v. LivingWell Midwest, Inc., No. 885340, 1988 WL 134497, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1988); International Union v. Garner, 601 F.
Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (mem.).
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be alone;18 the circumstances themselves in such cases are not secluded,19 and it is not an
invasion of her privacy to do no more than follow her about and watch her there.20
So far, the territorial facet of privacy has not been adequately applied to privacy in
cyberspace since cyberspace is not a physical space and was poorly analogized to one.21
Instead, only a vision of information or database privacy has been proffered, in all three
basic ways personal information can be digitally transmitted and collected from
computers and over the Internet - through Web sites, personal computers and network
service providers such as Internet service providers (ISPs).
First and the focal point of this study, is privacy policy for website collection of personal
data.22 Web sites collect personal data through cookies, registration forms, and
sweepstakes that require surrendering e-mail addresses and other information.23 Other
invasions of privacy relating to Web sites involve archives of comments made on the
"Usenet"24 or to "list servs",25 and deceptive promises that Web sites sometimes make
about privacy practices.26 Following with the U.S. Department of Health and Education"s

18
19

20
21
22

23

24

25

26

W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, at 855 & n.68; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, id, § 2.
See, e.g., Granger v. Klein, 197 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (Publication in high school
yearbook of photograph showing student urinating with his genitalia visible did not constitute
intrusion into seclusion, under Michigan law, by school's principal, assistant principal, and
yearbook advisor, and yearbook publisher, since they did not obtain photograph by objectionable
means; photograph was snuck into photo collage by student's friend, and yearbook was edited by
other students), Id.
W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, at 855 & n.68; 86 A.L.R.3d 374, supra note 16, § 2.
See, discussion at Part II.A.1-2, herein.
For surveys supporting the wide spread practice of data collection by websites, see, e.g.,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Surfer Beware: Personal Privacy and the Internet, at
http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html (suggesting that nearly half of the 100 most
popular Web sites collected information from users); Fed Trade Comm’n, Self-regulation and
privacy online: A report to Congress (July 1999) (hereinafter FTC Self-Regulation Report)
(available at <www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9907/-report-1999.htm>, referring to Georgetown Internet
Privacy Policy Survey <www.msb.edu/faculty/culnan/gippshome.html> (last visited 25 July 2004)
(suggesting that up to eighty-five percent of Web sites collect personal information from
consumers).
Michigan Law Revision Commission, Privacy and the Internet: A Study Report to the Michigan
Law Revision Commission, Michigan Law Revision Commission Thirty-Fifth Annual Report,
2000, at: http://www.milegislativecouncil.org/mlrc/2000/PrivacyandInternet.htm (Last visited July
28 2004), at 22 [Hereinafter, ‘Michigan Law Revision Commission’].
Usenet allows participants to post communications into a database that others can access. See, Id,
at 22.
List servs are listings of names and e-mail addresses that are grouped under a single name. See, Id,
at 22.
Id. Some web surfing instructions may not be translated into sensory effects at all but instead
direct the browser to take certain actions, such as changing the size of the window, opening a new
window, or reloading the page after a given amount of time. See JavaScript Guide
<http://developer.netscape.com/docs/manuals/communicator/jsguide4/index.htm>; An Exploration
of Dynamic Documents, <http://home.netscape.com/assist/net_sites/pushpull.html>. In addition,
web surfing takes other technical forms, such as, retrieving stored email files or sending outgoing
email files, as both are web-based activities. See, Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's scope: Interpreting
"Access" and "Authorization" in computer misuse statutes, 1596, N.Y.U. Law Rev. (2003), at
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elaboration of the first computer information privacy policy in 1973.27 Strict information
privacy protection for on-line environments was also adopted internationally by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1980.28 These guidelines
were based on eight principles of information privacy: collection limitation, data quality,
purpose specification, use limitation, transparency of information collection practices,
security of stored data, individual participation, and accountability.29 In implementation
of these principles, the Federal Trade Commission ultimately imported these guidelines’
information privacy orientation.30 It did so in outlining a set of Fair Information Practices
(FIPs) regulating collection and use of consumer-oriented personal information by
commercial web sites on the World Wide Web. 31 With the implementation of the
OECD’s privacy guidelines, the United States in fact has unequivocally chose to center
its privacy policy around information or database policy regulating collection and use of
personal information by commercial web sites.32
Second, in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information stored in a computer, within its meaning in the Fourth Amendment, Courts
have continuously treat the computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file
cabinet. Thus, again, adhering to information or database privacy.33 The most basic
Fourth Amendment question in computer cases asks whether an individual enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic information stored within computers (or

27

28

29
30
31

32

33

1648. These types of web surfing activities are, however, largely hidden from the user's
perspective and typically do not require an independent surrendering of private information.
See, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Secretary's Advisory Comm. On Automated Personal
Data Systems, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973), reprinted in U.S. Privacy
Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, 15 n.7 (1977). See,
also, Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 771 (1999), 773 & Fn. 9 and accompanying text [Hereinafter, ‘Reidenberg, Restoring
Americans' Privacy’].
See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, in OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
14-16 (Sept. 23, 1980), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/9302011E.pdf (last
visited 25 July, 2004) [Hereinafter, ‘OECD Guidelines’].
Id, at Part II.
Id, Paragraph 19: National implementation, §§ 69-70.
See U.S. The Federal Trade Commission on "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In the
Electronic Marketplace" (2000), at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm#N_1_
(last visited July 25 2004) [Hereinafter, ‘FTC, Privacy Online’]. The FIPs have never been fully
incorporated into U.S. law and merely remained a guiding source of law. For general discussion,
see, Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy; Julie E. Cohen, DRM and privacy, 18 Berkeley
Tech. & L.J. 575
Id, Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy, at 773-777 & accompanying notes (for the
historical account in the U.S.).
The Fourth Amendment is not applicable to private website data collectors, including users, as it
"is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the anticipation or knowledge of any
governmental official." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, the use of the Fourth Amendment 'expectation of privacy' standard should be used
in analogy, or as explained in context.
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other electronic storage devices) under the individual's control, such as their laptop
computers or floppy disks. As individuals generally retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of closed containers, they also generally retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in data held within electronic storage devices.34 Accordingly,
accessing information stored in a computer ordinarily will implicate the owner's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.35
Lastly, strict adherence to the category information privacy protection has been
established in government-network service providers’ relations and searching and seizing
computers and obtaining electronic evidence. In particular, Congress embedded this
policy in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 198636 updating the
Wiretap Act of 1968.37 ECPA regulates how the government can bind information
privacy obtaining stored account data in a computer38 or financial record or file39 from
network service providers such as ISPs.40 Such as, whenever agents or prosecutors seek
stored e-mail, account records, or subscriber information from a network service.41
Specifically, it expanded the coverage of the Wiretap Act by adding information or
database privacy protection through Title 1,42 addressing the unauthorized interception of
computer databases or electronic communication43 while “in transit”, and Title 2,44
addressing the unauthorized acquisition of electronic communications while “in
storage”.45 Overall, with several updates and expansions of the Wiretap Act, the ECPA
34
35

36

37
38

39
40

41

42
43

44
45

See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936-37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding reasonable
expectation of privacy in files stored on hard drive of personal computer); United States v. Reyes,
922 F. Supp. 818, 832-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in data
stored in a pager); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D.V.I. 1995) (same); United
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same); United States v. Blas, 1990 WL
265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990) (analogizing expectation of privacy "[I]n a pager,
computer, or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container.").
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), S. Rep. No. 99-541. 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1986) at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (1986) (ECPA S. Rep.) and codified at 18 U.S.C
§§ 2510-2541 (1988), citing United States v. New York Tel. Co. 434 U.S. 159, 167, 98 S.Ct. 364
(1977).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 and §§ 2701-10.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(1). Computer within its meaning in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) refers to a data
storage facility.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(a).
Other types of Network service providers are telephone companies, cell phone service providers,
and satellite services. See, Department of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining
Electronic
Evidence
in
Criminal
Investigations,
at:
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_III_ (last visited July 28 2004), at Introduction
[Hereinafter, DOJ Report].
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 creates statutory information privacy rights for customers and subscribers
of computer network service providers. See, also, DOJ Report, at Part III.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
Electronic communications include telegraph, telex communications, electronic mail, nonvoice
digitized transmissions, and the portion of video teleconferences that do not involve the hearing of
voice or oral sounds. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988), Id.
Id.
Electronic storage includes computer random access memory, magnetic tapes, disks, magnetic and
optical media, etc. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (1988), Id.
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became the predominant federal law protecting privacy through the category of
information privacy in electronic communications from unauthorized interception, use
and disclosure in all private network service providers, such as in cyberspace.46 As
mentioned, this paper will focus on the first category of website data collection.

B.

Territorial privacy: The missing category

In some situations the strict adherence to the category of information privacy provides
incomplete privacy solutions for website-related data collection practices. In such
situation, arguably, the integration of the category of territorial privacy should be
justified, in some analogy to physical world privacy protection. Largely put, the
limitations of strictly adhering to the category of information privacy are fourfold and
relate to: (1) the confusion concerning information privacy protection in multiple or
mixed files; (2) the sequential and fast-moving usage of files in website navigation, as
opposed to static data exchange in single databases; (3) the proprietary-based subject
matter of the exception "available to the public" within its meaning in § 2511(2)(g)(i) at
ECPA; and (4) the added value of territorial segregation of on-line areas to the
heterogeneity of data collection and consumers choice.
First, even though courts have largely approved that electronic storage devices can be
analogized to closed containers for Fourth Amendment purposes, they have reached
contradictory conclusions over whether each digital file stored on a computer or disk
should be treated as a separate closed container, subject to a single Fourth Amendment
procedure. Thus on the one hand, courts held that a computer disk containing multiple
files is a single container. For example, in United States v. Runyan,47 in which private
parties had searched certain files and found child pornography, the Fifth Circuit held
that the police did not exceed the extent of the private search when they examined
supplementary files on any disk that had been, in part, privately searched.48 Similarly, in
United States v. Slanina,49 the court held that when a warrantless search of a portion of a
computer and zip disk had been justified, the defendant no longer retained any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the remaining contents of the computer and disk,
and thus a comprehensive search by law enforcement personnel did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.50 These solutions, however, did not suggest a coherent substantive
legal policy.51 In similar cases, instead, courts refused to comply with this broad
interpretative approach. Thus, for example, in contradiction to the Fifth Circuit's
46

47
48
49
50
51

Interception of communications made outside the United States, however, is not within the scope
of ECPA, while U.S. interstate communications “affecting interstate of foreign commerce” are
included. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988), Id.
275 F.3d 449, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 464.
283 F.3d 670, 680 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Although courts do see such multiplicity as a concerning phenomenon, as a procedural matter,
however, evidence acquired from a network search that accessed data stored in multiple districts
should not lead to suppression unless the agents intentionally and deliberately disregarded Rule
41(a) (Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a)) or prejudice resulted. See generally United States v. Trost, 152 F.3d
715, 722 (7th Cir. 1998).
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approach, Tenth Circuit cases consistently have refused to allow such exhaustive
searches of a computer's hard in the absence of a warrant or some exception to the
warrant requirement.52 Particularly, the Tenth Circuit cautioned in a later case that
"[b]ecause computers can hold so much information touching on many different areas of
a person's life, there is greater potential for the 'intermingling' of documents and a
consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a
computer".53 Throughout the Internet, very large web sites may be spread over a number
of servers in different geographic locations.54 IBM is a good example; its Web site
consists of thousands of files spread out over many servers in world-wide locations
further defying the analogy between a file and a single container. Moreover, today, one
can have multiple web sites that cross-link to files on each others' sites or even share the
same files.55 These developments challenge even the Privacy Act's56 broad file-based
definition of a "record about an individual" as "any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual,"57 for the case of complex websites.
In continuation, arguably, this latter interpretative approach is becoming more acute, as
the structure of websites and navigation through their files has become more sequential
and fast-moving, as opposed to static data exchange in single files or databases.58 As
surfing speed, websites and servers complexity and size - all increase navigation
afforded by windows, menus, dialogue areas, control panels, etc. Thus, this
technological progress should, in fact, imply a processional understanding of web
navigation through sequences of content, as opposed to earlier structural file search,
dominant in the dissimilar physical world.59
Third, information privacy is also limited within the scope of ECPA's privacy exception
concerning files that are "available to the public" within its meaning in paragraph
2511(2)(g)(i).60 This section permits "any person" to intercept an electronic
communication made through a system "that is configured so that . . . [the]

52

53
54

55
56
57

58

59
60

See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273-75 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that agent exceeded
the scope of a warrant to search for evidence of drug sales at the point where he "abandoned that
search" and started searching for evidence of child pornography for five hours).
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001).
See,
searchWebServices.com
(‘web
site’)
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci541370,00.html (Defining a web
site as a related collection of World Wide Web (WWW) files that includes a beginning file called
a home page).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
Id. § 552a(a)(4). The Privacy Act, despite notable flaws, represents the most comprehensive
attempt to structure information processing within the public sector and applies, however, only to
federal agencies.
See, Aaron Marcus, "Principles of Effective Visual Communication for Graphical User Interface
Design," Readings in Human-Computer Interaction (2nd Ed.), Ed. Baecker, Grudin, Buxton, and
Greenberg, Morgan Kaufman, Palo Alto, 1995, at. 425-441. ISBN: 1-55860-246-1; Aaron Marcus,
"Metaphor Design in User Interfaces," The Journal of Computer Documentation, ACM/SIGDOC,
Vol. 22:2 (1998), at. 43-57.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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communication is readily accessible to the general public."61 This exception has not yet
been applied by the courts in any published cases concerning computers. This exception
is primarily defined with respect to radio communications in proposed section 210(16) of
title 18.62 Such 'public' communications would include the stereo subcarrier used in FM
broadcasting or data carried on the VBI to provide closed-captioning of TV programming
for the hearing-impaired.63 Thus, radio services readily accessible to the general public
are exempt from this act's prohibitions against interception by the generic exception
contained in paragraph 2511(2)(g)(i).64
Potentially, its language could permit the interception of an electronic communication
that has been posted to a public bulletin board, a public chat room, or a Usenet
newsgroup.65 Yet such understanding of the paragraph is still subject to several
difficulties. To begin with, the subject matter of that availability does not relate to a
private place or locale but, again, to a file or a computer. Thus, the same difficulties
described above remain present. Moreover, services are available to the public are a
"remote computing service", as under the definition provided by § 2711(2), a service can
only be a "remote computing service" if it is available "to the public." From a third party
off-site computer that stores information for a customer.66 This definition does not deal
however with electronic communications that are not remote computing services, such as
in the case of peer-to-peer communications. In addition, availability to the public such as
within its meaning in § 2702(a) assumes that services are available to the public if they
are available to any user who complies with the requisite procedures and pays any
requisite fees. Yet, thus far, ECPA's definition of "public" excludes providers whose
services are open only to those with a special relationship with the provider, such as
employers who provide network accounts only to employees.67 A territorial privacy
analysis instead, may in fact recognize public places even within privately provided
websites.68 Thus, while overriding the proprietary-based dependency on baseline
entitlements of services' owners and users.69 Lastly, ECPA's present interpretation of
61
62
63
64
65

66

67

68
69

Id.
See, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3572.
Id.
Id, at 3573.
See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3590 (discussing
bulletin boards).
The term "remote computing service" (RCS) means the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by an off-site computer that stores or processes data for a customer.
See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-65. For example, a
service provider that processes data in a time-sharing arrangement provides an RCS. See H.R.
Rep. No. 99-647, at 23 (1986).
See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (ruling that an
internal e-mail system that was made available to a hired contractor but was not available to "any
member of the community at large" is excluded from the public).
For further analogy with the physical world with application to websites, see Part III.C.1.a.2, infra.
See, also, United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001)
(ruling that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in use of a private
computer network when undercover federal agents looked over his shoulder, when he did not own
the computer he used). Nor will individuals generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of computers they have stolen. See United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031-32
(10th Cir. 1993).
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availability "to the public" raises a difficulty concerning the dependent definition of
'intercept'. Such as when the seizure of a computer on which is stored private E-mail that
has been sent to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by the
recipients, constitutes an 'intercept' proscribed by § 2511(1)(a).70 In such conflict, a
territorially based analysis would have maintained that even when control over the
communication remains at the hand of the sender, the private communication
nevertheless belongs to the public sphere by a question of its mere location (once it has
been posted), overriding the question of whether such communication was later on
intercepted.71
Fourth, the category of information privacy may generate only a sub-optimal added value
from territorial segregation of heterogeneous on-line areas, preventing distinct data
collection practices and consumers' navigation choices. Consequently, as Tiebout’s wellknown theorem all-purposely predicts, the further allocation of legal rights to different
types of territorial locales, predominantly private and public, would exercise strong
effects upon the heterogeneity of data collection practices, justifying the geographical
variation of on-line privacy rules altogether.72 In the physical world, Tiebout's theorem is
widely used to explain the demand curve economic causes of urban spatial segregation.
Using a system of decentralized provision of public good such as privacy through selfregulated websites owners, consumers would be required to reveal their true preference
for different amounts of the privacy in the form of their own personal demand curve for
whole websites or separate areas in them. As Tiebout describes “Spatial mobility
provides the local public goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip.”73
Tiebout’s thinking points to a clustering effect in which users of very similar demands for
the local public good naturally would then choose to subsist in the same on-line
community. In cyberspace, such segregated on-line territorial areas would then be backed
by different privacy policies, specifically private and public territorial privacy policies,
competing with websites owner's offering only information privacy instead.
To conclude, the added value of on-line territorial privacy must be carefully considered.
As would be explained, it would legitimate observance and non-identifiable data
collection in an on-line public locale or in a locale that may be viewed from a public
one. Notably, with regard to databases, much information collection and use occurs in
what would otherwise be considered public, and, indeed, many parts of cyberspace may
well be considered public locales.74 A chat room, for example, can be maintained as

70

71
72
73
74

See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460. In support of the general interception standard, see also,
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184 ("[A]n e-mail message . . . cannot be afforded a reasonable
expectation of privacy once that message is received."). But see C. Ryan Reetz, Note, Warrant
Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 179, 200-06 (1987)
(arguing that certain kinds of remotely stored computer files should retain Fourth Amendment
protection, and attempting to distinguish United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland).
For further analogy with the physical world with application to websites,, see Part III.C.1.A, infra.
Id.
Id, at 422.
See, e.g., Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 30, at 1433. See, also, discussion in Part III.B.2,
infra.
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either a Web site or part of a Web site.75 With lack of sufficient clarity, even potential
public locales, such as chat rooms, are presently under regulated, lacking privacy policy
precision.76
The absence of self-regulation or new legislation integrating territorial privacy already
brings into question the extent to which website owners will seek to shield themselves
from liability for deceptive practices by not establishing a privacy policy in the first
instance. The FTC's enforcement action against GeoCities highlights the leaky privacy
protection offered by websites.77 GeoCities markets itself as a "virtual community"
that organizes its members' home pages into forty different areas, termed
"neighborhoods." In these areas, members can post a personal Web page, receive e-mail,
and participate in chat rooms. Non-members can also visit many areas of GeoCities.
According to the FTC, GeoCities engaged in two kinds of deceptive practices in
connection with its collection and use of personal information. First, although GeoCities
promised a limited use of the data it collected, it in fact sold, rented, and otherwise
disclosed this information to third parties who used it for purposes well beyond the scope
of permission given by individuals. At no point, however, was this practice recognized in
what would otherwise been acknowledged as GeoCities's public locale. Second,
GeoCities promised that it would be responsible for maintenance of the data collected
from children in the "Enchanted Forest" part of its Web site. Instead, it turned such
personal information over to third parties called "community leaders." That activity could
have been made legitimate, by considering or allowing the construction of that part of its
website as public. Finally, GeoCities settled with the FTC and promised to make

75

76

77

See,
searchWebServices.com
(‘Chat
room’)
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci541370,00.html (last visited July.
20, 2004).
See Am. Online, Inc., AOL Instant Messenger Web Chat Rules & Etiquette, at
http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html (last visited July. 20, 2004) (containing a murky list of
web chat rules and etiquette: “When communicating in a chat room be mindful that many people
will be able to view it and the inclusion of information such as your name, your address or
telephone number is never recommended.”…“It's also a good rule-of-thumb to check the Privacy
Policies of any unfamiliar or new web sites you visit.”). Then, see also, Am. Online, Privacy
Policy, http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.adp (last visited July. 20, 2004) (ignoring the public
nature of chat rooms, while over inclusively stating "This privacy policy applies to the AOL.com
site”). See, also, Yahoo's privacy policy available at: http://privacy.yahoo.com (last visited July.
20, 2004) (same). See, additionally, United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (denying a reasonable expectation of privacy in a chat room providing that defendant is
made aware of the operating procedures in that chat room); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J.
406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (mentioning in dicta "[m]essages sent to the public at large in the 'chat
room' . . . lose any semblance of privacy").
See GeoCities, File No. 9823015 (Fed. Trade Comm. 1998) (agreement containing consent order).
The
GeoCities
Consent
Order
can
also
be
found
at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/-9808/geo-ord.htm>. For a discussion, see FTC, Analysis of
Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment <www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/9823015.ana.htm>. The GeoCities Web site is located at <http://www.geocities.com>. The FTC was able to
obtain jurisdiction in this case only because GeoCities' false representations regarding its privacy
practices constituted "deceptive acts or practices" within the meaning of under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
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significant changes in its privacy practices.78 The final order permits GeoCities to collect
or use personal data about children to the extent permitted by the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998.79 Again, this is while ignoring the possibility of
recognizing a separate privacy policy for a public part of its website.
The value of integrating on-line territorial privacy, nevertheless, is not comparable for all
types of data collected: Currently, there are two basic ways used by websites to collect
such non-content personal information.80 The first is by directly collecting information
from users (“registration” and “transactional” data).81 Registration data is collected by
those websites that request users to log in order to access parts of the website. In
reference to ECPA's definitions, Registration data can be seen as "Basic subscriber
information" within its meaning at paragraph 2703(c)(2).82 A second type of data that
collected directly by websites is transactional data. It is gleaned by websites engaging in
business with users, such as selling merchandise or services.83 In reference to ECPA's
§ 2703(c)(1), transactional data relates to "a record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of
communications)." The broad definition of this category seems to comprise of all records
that are not contents, including basic subscriber information.
The second way through which websites collect data is indirect, by tracking the way
people navigate through the Internet (“clickstream” data), it enables the website to
calculate how many times it has been visited and what parts are the most popular.84 It
may be seen to include also information revealed by uniquely distinguishing features of a
user's computer, such as the unique serial numbers contained in Intel's Pentium III
78

79

80

81

82

83
84

See GeoCities Proposed Consent Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,624 (1998) (final approval Feb. 12,
1999); FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal
Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case <www.ftc.gov/-opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm>.
See Jeffrey P. Cunard, Jennifer B. Coplan & George Vradenburg, III, Communications Law 1999,
581 PLI/Pat 853 (Nov. 1999).
There is also "Contents" within its meaning at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2703(c)(1) in ECPA. The
contents of a network account are the actual files stored in the account. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
In practice, however, website owners do not typically collect 'contents'. Alternatively, this type of
data collection may limit user's 'communications privacy' (see Part I.A), whenever it is collected
by other users. See, also discussion, herein.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and power: Computer databases and metaphors for information privacy,
53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, at 1411 [Hereinafter, ‘Solove, Privacy and Power’].
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) lists the categories of basic subscriber information: (A) name; (B) address;
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and
durations; (D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone
or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address; and (F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card
or bank account number)[.]. In general, the items in this list recount the identity of a subscriber,
but for ECPA's purposes, also his association with his ISP, and his basic session connection
records. The PATRIOT Act enhanced the categories of basic subscriber information in three
respects. See PATRIOT Act § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). It added "records of session times
and durations," as well as "any temporarily assigned network address" to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2);
Lastly, the "means and source of payment" that a customer uses to pay for an account, "including
any credit card or bank account number."
Solove, Privacy and Power, Id.
Solove, Privacy and Power, Id.
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chips.85 As this paper argues, database protection against such forms of information
collection, but particularly registration data that is collected upon initial entry to
databases, is an overly generalized and thus over inclusive privacy category.86 It
implicitly includes both possible public and private on-line locales, while overly
protecting the former.
Lastly on-line territorial privacy, arguably, should not categorically replace on-line
information privacy but, whenever necessary and possible, complement it. In the physical
world, courts have, in fact, rejected cases involving territorial intrusion whenever privacy
infringed was done in databases and would therefore belong to the category of
information or database privacy, such as, while rejecting obtaining a person's unlisted
phone number,87 the selling subscription lists to direct mail companies,88 or the collecting
and disclosing an individual's past insurance history.89 Constructing a similar balance
within cyberspace, therefore, would not be unprecedented.

C. Constructing on-line territoriality: The argument's structure
In analogy to the physical world, the suggested adaptation of territorial privacy to
cyberspace based on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion will overcome many of these
anomalies. Notably it would prevail over the obstacles left by the doctrine of trespass to
chattels, commonly referred to in access policy cases in cyberspace.90 Particularly,
territorial privacy and private and public locales, more specifically, could coexist on the
Internet, just as they do in the physical world.91 Courts may then be required to
85

86

87
88
89
90

91

See, Michigan Law Revision Commission, Privacy and the Internet: A Study Report to the
Michigan
Law
Revision
Commission,
Michigan
Law
Revision
Commission
Thirty-Fifth
Annual
Report,
2000,
available
at:
http://www.milegislativecouncil.org/mlrc/2000/PrivacyandInternet.htm (Last visited July 28
2004), at 15).
Definitions of database or equivalent terms in proposed U.S. legislation, such as the Consumer and
Investor Access Bill, have been a little more detailed. See, H.R. 1858 §101(1). See, also,
Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing private rights and public reconceptualizing property in databases,
Berkeley Tech. Law J. 773 (2003).
Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978).
Under the alternative doctrine of trespass to chattels, an actor can commit a trespass to chattels by
using or intermeddling with a chattel only if it is in the possession of another. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 217(b) (1965). See, also, Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political
Activity on Private Lands, Id, at 655 (similarly arguing for the physical world). Further on, while
trespass to chattels can represent the civil branch of the unauthorized access cases, it does not
focus on the privacy of the data subject per se. Rather, it focuses on the concept of intrusion into a
protected area that is different than access to the data subject or appropriation of the information
gathered. See, e.g., Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996), at 61.
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 154 (1998); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609, 1657 (1999), at 1664 (adding to the public
and private also the quasi-public locale), at 1667. Notwithstanding the importance of the latter
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differentiate and identify public locales and then fence them out from private ones. Thus
far, cyberspace has not been left with public locales, nor has a balanced territorial privacy
policy been established. Instead, only a private, and too wide, privacy legal rule has been
adopted. In continuation to previous jurisprudential developments, privacy should
continue to be revalued instrumentally.92 Ultimately, a legal fiction of on-line locales
should now be constructed for cyberspace’s overall privacy policy.93 For such legal
fiction to be effectively applicable and harmonious with privacy protection at large, a
comprehensive boundary framework for cyberspace has to first be agreed upon, as
explained in Parts II-VI, in the following order.
Part II provides with an overview of the two competing boundary approaches for
cyberspace. Arguably, thus far, cyberspace is still left without a comprehensive boundary
approach and Courts or legislators have not yet been successful in collectively adopting
one. In theory, however, cyberspace boundary discourse is, nevertheless, present, and has
thus far only given rise to two conflicting approaches, referred to herein as the ‘globalist’
and the ‘anti-globalist,’ while largely ignoring the more sensible legal alternative – one
based on a ‘localist’ boundary approach, which will be critically assessed in this part.
The first, therefore, is the globalist boundary theory approach. It is a rather optimistic
technologically-oriented analysis, which suggests that cyberspace is bound to be zoned
similarly to the physical world, although separate on-line spatiality does not exist,
according to Lessig or Shapiro, most notably; or that spatiality exists separately from the
physical world and might allow some degree of zoning, according to Johnson and Post. In
both ways, spatiality is seen merely as a technological constraint that, in fact, could
override the legal understanding of spatiality. In essence, both are looking for a
technological solution and, in fact, underestimate the role of law in erecting boundaries in
cyberspace. Both, therefore, uphold two competing versions of a globalist boundary
theory for cyberspace. The second approach could be seen as an antithesis to the globalist
approach, in the face of an anti-globalist boundary theory for cyberspace. Among its
supporters are Hunter, Lemley and others who also focus their spatial analysis on the
technological regulative constraint. Their message largely rejects the spatial analogy
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category, and in compliance with the tort of intrusion jurisprudence, I will ignore the latter
category. See, also, discussion, herein.
See, also, Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1144-1145; Julie C. Inness, supra note
1, at 95. One example is the Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438
(1928) epitomizes the need for interpretive flexibility in constructing privacy. The Court held that
the wiretapping of a person's home telephone (done outside a person's house) did not run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a person's home, Id. at 465.
Only in 1967, overruling Olmstead did the Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) hold
construct that wiretapping does not necessitate physical trespass. See, also, Carl Shapiro & Hal R.
Varian,
U.S.
Government
Information
Policy
45
(July
30,
1997)
<http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/policy/policy.html#SECTION0008100000000000000
0> (Section on Privacy) (last visited 25 July 004).
See generally, also, Andrew L. Shapiro, Street Corners in Cyberspace, The Nation, July 3, 1995
(in justification of the 1st Amendment "public forum” doctrine); David J. Goldstone, a Funny
Thing Happened on The Way To The Cyber Forum: Public v. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (Winter 1998), at 3 (same). See, also discussion, herein.
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between the physical space and cyberspace; as Cyberspace is not a real ‘place’, but
instead is a medium as tangible objects do not exist "there”.94
Geared with the motivation to find and legalize their underlying scientific truths, both the
globalist and anti-globalist approaches share a tendency to over-scientize the law in those
instances when science and law interact, as then can be applied through the case of online territorial privacy protection. Arguably, both approaches do not seem to have
appropriately dealt with challenge to their scientific or hypothetical truths, which they
assume, nor do they seem to have adequately confronted the constructive legal
implications of an altogether contending localist boundary theory for cyberspace. Legal
truth, such as the one suggested for the formalization of on-line spatiality, should then, in
fact, be a tentative scientific truth transformed from mere scientific truths, backed by
legal values, to an inclusive legal truth by courts or other regulating institutions.
As would be reminded, Anglo-American jurisprudence has a long record of viewing
factual or scientific truth as only one parameter in establishing legal truth. The factual or
scientific validity of spatial or non-physical boundaries, therefore, should not inherently
serve as a binding constraint on a possible legal formation of on-line locales. In
continuation, areal or local differentiation should now replace the homogenous spatial
organization as the major conceptual focus of cyberspace’s globalist boundary theory.
Consequently, the allocation of legal rights to different types of locales, predominantly
private and public, may then exercise strong effects upon the heterogeneity of data
collection practices, justifying the geographical variation of on-line privacy rules
altogether.
Part III, consequently, upholds that law may indeed construct a legal fiction of on-line
locales. Seen through the prism of the cumulative characteristics of legal fictions, this
chapter confronts both globalist and anti-globalist boundary rationales, in support of the
comprehensive theoretical structure of localist boundary application to law at large.
Ultimately, this part applies the construction of a legal fiction of on-line locales to
territorial privacy as part of cyberspace’s overall privacy policy.
Part IV deduces several policy rationales concerning the prospect of integrating territorial
privacy in cyberspace. It concludes by suggesting that notwithstanding the category of
information privacy protection, territorial privacy upon cyberspace’s private and public
locales, more specifically, could coexist on the Internet, similarly to the physical world.
Courts may then be required to differentiate and identify public locales and then fence
them out from private ones.

94

See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as place and the tragedy of the digital anticomons, 91 Cal. L.
Rev. 439 (2003), at 472; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (2003), at
523; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217, at 217;
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an
Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 561 (2001), at 567 [Hereinafter, ‘O'Rourke, Property
Rights’].

17

CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY

II.
CYBERSPACE BOUNDARY DISCOURSE: THE TWO APPROACHES

In the quest for exercising regulatory or judicial jurisdiction in the physical sphere, the
Anglo-American legal system traditionally requires the establishment of a ‘geographic
nexus’--the connection required to give an individual or government a legitimate interest
in a legal controversy in a given ‘locale’.95 In terms of political geography, it is largely
agreed that any boundary theory consists of the attributes of such locales in space (points,
lines, or areas) and the interactions, or nexus, between these locations.96 In this sense,
space is the conceptualization of the imagined physical relationships, which gives
meaning to society.97 Locale, on the other hand, is the distinct space that encompasses
both the idea and the actuality of where things are.98 Referring to the nested hierarchy of
bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national and global, is a
familiar and taken-for-granted concept of political geographers and political analysts.99
Thus, numerous scholars have employed a framework that employs three scales of
analysis – international or global, national or state level, and an intra-national, usually an
urban metropolitan scale.100 They are relatively closed and self-sufficient systems.101
Incorporated also into the physical world’s legal discourse, two main competing
interpretive border theories, thus far, have developed: A globalist and a localist, each, as
will be explained, insufficiently attentive to the values represented by the other.102 They
pivot around the basic unit of the state- hence the international, national and intra-
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See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Stretching The Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental
Law, Stan. L. Rev. 1247 (1996), at 1247, 1273-1275 (in application to international environmental
law); Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, Stan. L.
Rev. 1279 (1996) (same).
For matters of convenience, the terms ‘locale’ and ‘location’ would be used correspondingly.
Edward W. Soja, A paradigm for the geographical analysis of political systems (1974), 43-71, In
Locational approaches to power and conflict, Kevin R. Cox, David Reynolds & Stein Rekkan
(Eds.), at 53 [Hereinafter, ‘Soja, A paradigm’]; R.J. Johnson, spatial structures (Mathuen: London,
1973), p. 14; Hence Short, An introduction to political geography (Routledge & Kegan Paul:
London, 1982) 1; David Delaney & Helga Leitner, The political construction of scale, Political
Geography, Vol. 16 No. 2, 93 (1997), at 93.
M. Keith & S. Pile, (eds.), Place and Politics of identity (London Routledge, 1993); A. Gupta,
Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, The culture of politics, and the imagined state,
American Ethnologist vol. 22, no. 2 (1992), at 375-402.
Id, at 375-402.
David Delaney & Helga Leitner, supra note 45, at 93.
See, e.g., Peter Tylor, Political geography: world-economy, nation-state and locality (Longman
Scientific & technical, 1993), p. 43.
R.J. Johnson, supra note 45, at 14.
Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Berg,
1999), at 9; Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1247, 1248, 1270-1271 (investigating the conflict
between localist and global perspectives in environmental law); Edward Soja, Surveying Law and
Borders – Afterward, Stan. L. Rev. 1421 (1996), at 1426 (same) [Hereinafter, ‘Soja, Surveying
Law and Borders’]; Soja, A paradigm, supra note 45, at 53.
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national terminology.103 The first is a spatial analysis, which refers to globalist boundary
theory as has been adopted, for instance, in international environmental or even criminal
law. Globalism gives every government an equally legitimate concern with every issue,
without offering any line drawing rationale, and, in that sense, attempts to erase
geographic discontinuity. The basic idea of globalism is that legal controversies know no
territorial boundaries.104 What happens in one place affects everyone everywhere, and no
particular geographic nexus should be required as a basis for legal action.105 According to
the globalist approach, geographical uniformity is not an inevitable feature of a legal
rule.106
The second is an areal analysis, which refers to localist boundary theory. Localism tends
to place talismanic weight on physical location and presence as its core concern.107 At the
international level, localism is surely the baseline.108 An individual physically present in a
locale has a cognizable interest in it, just as governments have a legitimate interest in
threats that are physically present within their territories.109 The perception that objective
physical conditions vary from locale to locale may then lead rule makers to pursue a
consistent and comprehensive legal policy by adopting different localized legal rules,
based on respective distinctive jurisdictions. Arguably, thus far, cyberspace is still left
without an applicable boundary approach and Courts or legislators have successfully
adopted none. In theory, however, cyberspace boundary discourse is, nevertheless,
present, and has thus far only given rise to two conflicting approaches, globalist and antiglobalist, while largely ignoring the more sensible legal alternative – one based on a
localist boundary approach, which will be critically assessed herein.
Thus far, the regulative debate regarding the question of spatiality in cyberspace has
primarily presented contradicting approaches towards globalist boundary theory. The first
is a basic globalist boundary approach. Its' rather optimistic, technologically-oriented
analysis suggests that cyberspace is bound to be zoned similarly to the physical world,
although separate on-line spatiality does not exist, according to scholars like Lessig or
Shapiro, most notably, or that spatiality exists separately and might allow some degree of
zoning, according to Johnson and Post. In both ways, spatiality is merely seen as a
technological constraint that overrides any legal definition of spatiality. Thus, in
agreement with Johnson and Post, Lessig predicts that in cyberspace the game is
becoming code. Law is a sideshow. Thus, this technological primacy is more than a
difference in efficiency.110 In essence, both are looking for a technological solution,
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See, e.g., Peter Tylor, supra note 49, at. 44.
See, also, Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating
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Regulation, 181 (1997), at 182; L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (basic books,
1999), at 130 [Hereinafter, ‘Lessig, Code and Other Laws’].
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which arguably underestimate the role of law. Both, overall, uphold two competing
versions of a globalist boundary approach for cyberspace. The second approach stands as
an antithesis to the former and could be seen as an anti-globalist boundary approach.
Among its supporters are Hunter, Lemley and others who also focus their spatial analysis
on the technological regulative constraint. Nevertheless, their rather skeptical inclination
is to argue that technology has in fact, failed to create substantive on-line spatiality and
none can be put in its place. As will be briefly described herein, both the globalist and the
anti-globalist approaches alike do not seem to appropriately have dealt with challenge to
the underlying scientific or hypothetical truths which they assume, nor do they seem to
have adequately confronted the constructive legal implications of an altogether
contending localist boundary theory for cyberspace.

A.

Globalist boundary theory: Johnson & Post and Lessig

Until the digital era, there has been a general correspondence between borders drawn in
physical space (between nation states or other political entities) and their conceptual
definitions in what Johnson and Post allegorically call "law space”.111 Nowadays,
cyberspace is dealing with a genuine fencing challenge with ‘law space’, or, more simply,
law, needing to correspond to non-physical jurisdictions. Consequently, cyberspace is
experiencing a conflict between different boundary theory traditions that affects its
culture and development.112 Thus far, application of cyberspace globalist boundary
theory, notably, focuses not on whether fencing in or fencing out is more appropriate for
some aspect of cyberspace, but whether there could and should be fences at all and, in
some cases, whether law has the legitimacy to erect them.
In compliance with the acute technologically oriented approach that focuses on the
technological reality as the main constraint, Courts seemed to have generally followed
this technocentristic line of argumentation. That choice was ultimately encapsulated in
the constituting case of Reno v. ACLU,113 where the Court concluded that the Internet
was deserving of full First Amendment protection, not the lesser protection afforded to
broadcast media. In so doing, the Court considered how well each metaphor actually
applied cyberspace. The court concluded that cyberspace allowed the construction of
barriers and their use to screen for identity, making cyberspace more like the physical
world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning laws.114 Justice O'Connor's opinion
makes that very controversial assumption, observing "[c]yberspace undeniably reflects
some form of geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed 'locations'
on the Internet”.115
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David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L.
Rev. 1367 (1996), at 1368 [Hereinafter, ‘Johnson & Post’].
Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the “Devil’s Hatband,” 24 Seattle U. L. Rev. 577, 591-92
(2000), at 585.
See, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
Id, at 2354.
See, 117 S. Ct. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
For opposing opinions in few lower instances, see, e.g., American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.
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Nevertheless, the major difficulty with this strict comparison between cyberspace and the
physical world is the line of argument which suggests that the aggregate existence of
distinctive locales implies a globalist boundary notion of continuous spatiality, whether in
connection with the physical world or not. In other words, if we recognize that
cyberspace is constituted by locales in which a variety of interactions may occur, one
must think about the spatial relationship among them.
This technologically oriented view of at least physical-virtual continuous spatiality,
upheld by the Supreme Court has also gained itself popularity among the academic
community. The works of Lawrence Lessig, Andrew Shapiro, Trotter Hardy, and
others are perhaps those that most paved the way in that direction. In compliance with
the Court’s continuity choice, unlike Johnson and Post, who argue for a separation
between real space law and Cyberspace law, Lessig, most notably, does not believe that
it can be sustained or that it should be.116
Putting much faith in technology at the expense of a weakened legal approach, Lessig
promises us “what is missing in discourse about Cyberspace and its regulation is a richer
understanding of the range of architectures that are possible”.117 The architecture of
Cyberspace, we are told, will in principle allow for perfect zoning--a way to perfectly
exclude those who would cross boundaries.118 Advances in technology, not law, we are
told, will make zoning the Internet feasible in the future.119
Overall, Lessig and Hardy and others agree that zoning will replace the present
wilderness of Cyberspace, implicitly adhering to a globalist boundary approach in
cyberspace, in concert with Johnson and Post. In this spatial realm where technology is
king, zoning will be achieved through code--a tool, as Johnson and Post suggest, more
perfect than any equivalent tool of zoning in real space.120 In further recognition of a
spatial approach to cyberspace, it is, then, probably the case that both the cost of drawing
borders--identifying digital information as one's own--and the cost of monitoring border
trespasses--detecting unauthorized copying or alterations--seem to be no higher in
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1997).
Lawrence Lessig, The zones of cyberspace, Stan. L. Rev. 1403 (1996), at 1403 [Hereinafter,
Lessig, Zones of cyberspace’]; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 Harvard Law Review 501 (1999), at 3, 55; Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 703 (1998), at 704, 714-715
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Surveying Law and Borders, Supra note 51, at 1427. For earlier observations, see also, M. Ethan
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1681 (1995), referring to Joshua Meyrowitz, No sense of place: The impact of electronic media on
social behavior (1985), at 38 ([P]hysical settings and media "settings" are part of a continuum
rather than a dichotomy), at 1686.
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 56 (1999), at 60, 64.
Lessig, Zones of cyberspace, supra note 64, at 1409.
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 869, (1996), at 886-901.
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Cyberspace than they are for real property.121 Such costs may even be lower in
Cyberspace thanks to recent technological developments.122
In opposition to Lessig’s view regarding a continuous physical-virtual spatiality lays a
competing globalist boundary approach, which suggests that specialty in cyberspace, is
in fact, separate from that of the physical world. This view, as well, upholds a strict
technologically centered approach, while suggesting that spatiality is mostly a
technological concern.123
The leaders of this alternative libertarian orthodoxy are David Post and David
Johnson.124 Their major explicit globalist premise, therefore, is that Cyberspace is a
space or has the characteristics of a space, in disconnection from physical space.125 As
they suggest, many of the jurisdictional and substantive quandaries raised by bordercrossing electronic communications could be resolved by one simple principle:
conceiving of Cyberspace as a distinct space for purposes of legal analysis by
recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the physical world.126
On a normative level, their argument then follows to argue against the adaptation of
“geographic legal space” to “cyber space or spaces”. Traditional legal reasoning, we
are told, is not only secondary in constraining behavioral preferences on-line, but
potentially disruptive. Consequently, because there are no physical locales there should
not be ‘legal’ ones.127 Thus, any insistence on "reducing" all on-line transactions to a
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Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379, 1381.
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Id, 1370-72. See, also, Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. R. 1095 (1996), at
1098-99 [Hereinafter, ‘Burk, Federalism’]; Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage, in Borders in Cyberspace 129, 142-55 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds.,
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legal analysis based in geographic terms presents, in effect, a new "mind-body"
problem on a global scale.128
As a legal matter, leading an original globalist border theory approach to cyberspace,
they treat Cyberspace as a separate "space" to which the application of distinct sets of
laws should come naturally.129 Therefore, we must either refrain from applying these
ineffective real- space laws to Cyberspace, or devise new laws or modes of regulation
that can effectively regulate Cyberspace. In reaching their result they argue why localist
border theory concepts such as ‘physical proximity’, ‘locations’ and ‘boundaries’ are no
longer a prime determinant of the relationship between cause and effect in human
interaction on line.130 Acceptance of the so-called "separateness" of Cyberspace also
encourages an inference that the character of Cyberspace law must differ from the
character of law governing real space.131
Using this new approach, they suggest, we would no longer ask the unanswerable
question "where" in the geographical world a Net-based transaction occurred.132 In
conclusion, Johnson and Post argue that the power to control activity in Cyberspace has
only the most tenuous connections to physical locales.133 Upholding a typical globalist
boundary approach in Cyberspace, they argue, physical borders no longer function as
signposts informing individuals of the obligations assumed by entering into a new,
legally significant, space.134 Individuals are unaware of the existence of those borders as
they move through virtual space.135
Interestingly enough, these two globalist boundary approaches to cyberspace are mostly
compared for what they disagree about; that is, whether specialty in cyberspace is
separate than that of the physical world. At the same time, it is important to mention that
both views also seem to share similar globalist spatial proposition. Both, in fact, agree
that spatiality is mostly a technological concern. By default, both approaches also give
only a secondary role to law as a behavioral constraint in cyberspace. Inherently
complying with a globalist notion of spatiality, both positively concur that as much as
zoning can serve us to uphold on-line locality, strict ‘gateway’ technology zoning is
capable to provide a comprehensive boundary theory, that is, clearly without the need or
ability to construct of legal solutions, such as the legal fiction of on-line locales.
As would be argued later on, a preferred localist boundary theory and practice in
cyberspace, may in fact allow us to avoid the technological challenge of zoning
cyberspace with totality – the problematic creation of an inherent continuous space within
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Id, at 1379; David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on
the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in Coordinating the Internet 62 (Brian
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cyber locales and the erection of outer boundaries surrounding cyberspace. Based on the
accumulated experience of law and political geography, in application of localist
boundary theory - this technocentristic globalist boundary center of attention on outer
boundaries and inner continuation is, in fact, of marginal practical importance. It puts less
emphasis on both the sufficiency of inner, discontinuous and differentiated boundaries
and locales, and the relative, adaptive and constructive nature of legal reasoning at large.
Secondly, it also falls short of adhering to a legal zoning solution in the case technology
fails to, while wrongly concluding that because physical borders are not applicable, the
only alternative to zoning is technological. As Maureen O'Rourke rightly suggests,
notwithstanding the importance of how law will eventually evolve in network
environments, such as cyberspace, it is at least as important to fill a gap with legal
reasoning by discussing not only the boundaries between and within physical and virtual
space but also the boundaries between different sets of law.136 Accordingly, there is a
need not only for understandings of what legal rules govern but also how they relate to
each other.137 In disagreement with these globalist boundary approaches, this study later
on argues that such legal solutions do not assume perfect scientific solutions, but legally
functional and comprehensive ones.

B.

Anti-globalist boundary theory: Hunter and Lemley

Following the globalist approach lays an alternative anti-boundary theory one. Like its
counter version, it also views the question of on-line spatiality as a question of strictly
realistic factual or scientific truth. As a result, we are told that “[I]t is wishful thinking to
assume that geographic indeterminacy will prevail and that the Internet is pure
information”.138 Accordingly, Courts can and should take the differences between
cyberspace and the physical world into account,139 as this notion can have a profound
consequence for legal analysis.140 The recognition that the Internet is not just like the
physical world, and that the ways in which it is different may matter to the outcome of
cases, is critical.141 Consequently, strict factual or scientific truth holders, such as Hunter
and Lemley tell us that because the metaphor is not just like the physical world – courts
inappropriately use it. Their main message is that Cyberspace is not a real global space,
of course, and tangible objects do not exist in locales "there”.142 Thus, declining the
globalist spatial assumption for cyberspace, it suggests that the analogy between the
Internet and a physical space and locales is not sustainable.143 These views as well,
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nevertheless, arguably undermine the importance of the legal constraint in the search for
comprehensive and sustainable boundary solutions. According to this version of the
globalist boundary discourse, factual or scientific truths, in fact, stand for a skeptical view
of the technological constraint.
Both the globalist and the anti-globalist approaches, in their way, seem to uphold an
absolute view of the question of on-line spatiality, while adhering to an “all-or-nothing”
regulative view regarding the existence of a globalist perception of an on-line space.
From a legal perspective, this technocentristic factual or scientific truth should instead be
only one parameter in establishing a legal truth and is but the handmaiden of legal
reasoning.144 In opposition to these views, arguably, legal analysis must now expand
existing jurisdictional rules into workable legal doctrine also in cyberspace, as made
possible through the prism of the localist boundary approach.
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See, John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, on Subordination of "Scientific Truth" to “Legal
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III.
THE LOCALIST BOUNDARY SYNTHESIS: A LEGAL FICTION OF ONLINE LOCALES

A.

Overview

Legal truth, suggested here for the formalization of on-line spatiality, is in fact a tentative
scientific truth, backed by legal values, to an inclusive legal truth constructed by courts or
other regulating institutions. Fuller frames a legal fiction as a false statement recognized
as having utility,145 or a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness
of its falsity.146 This part shows that both settings, in fact, entail a more pragmatic
framework to formalizing on-line locales, whenever localist boundary theory is applied.
In continuation, a legal fiction is then constructed through a three criteria classification
scheme. First, a legal fiction has to be based on an inference justified by common
experience in two levels. It has to be grounded on absence of other proof and be drawn
from available evidence. Second, it has to be formalized as either conclusive, or freely
rebuttable. Lastly, a legal fiction has to be phrased in realistic terms. A final construction
of a legal fiction of on-line locales based in its meaning in localist boundary theory,
would then comply with the line of argument suggested herein, which upholds that
eventually positive law and particularly territorial privacy, can and should be applied to
all of Cyberspace effectively. Whenever the legal fiction of on-line locale can provide,
cyberspace should not be in any way special or immune from legal reach, such as in the
case of territorial privacy law jurisprudence.

B.

The Epistemological framework:

1.

Recognition of Utility, or

A legal fiction can be a false statement recognized as having utility.147 Such legal fictions
would then be constructed upon their functionality.148 That requirement is also met by
localist boundary theory, suggesting that there should be a local center that would provide
a local public or private good commonly provided in network environments. In other
words, the periphery should be able to determine a regulative function comprising all
145
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Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967), at 9.
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Minghi, Boundary studies in political geography, In R.E. Kasperson & J.V. Minghi (eds.), The
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aspects of law as a local public or private good, which could suit the utility of the legal
system at large. For that matter, the construction of on-line locales, upon their
functionality should be based on three conditions. The first is the preliminary recognition
that such distinctive locales are actually necessary. The second is that strict technological
solutions would not suffice. Lastly, the construction of on-lie locales upon their
functionality would need to be based on the alternative certainty that formalizing legal
locales on-line indeed is feasible.

a. Lack of distinctive locales
Arguably, the present inclination to either undermine demarcation between locales online, in favor of globalist boundary theory support for homogenous continuation, as
manifested by Johnson and Post; or reject boundary theory ab initia, while implicitly
upholding only privately oriented privacy policies, as reaffirmed by other scientific
truisms - nevertheless seems to be based on a largely accepted deformations of
cyberspace’s architecture, in comparison to that of the physical world’s. This distortion is
largely threefold, referring to cyberspace’s initial private sphere default rule design, the
lack of separate transfer costs through neighboring locales, and the low transaction costs
of entry into them.
First, historically, it has to do with the opposite way in which the public/private
distinction has evolved in the physical world in comparison to cyberspace. In the physical
world the public/private distinction arose out of a double movement in modern political
and legal thought.149 On the one hand, with the emergence of the nation-state and theories
of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ideas of distinctly public
locales began to take shape.150 On the other hand, in reaction to the claims of monarchs,
and later parliaments, to the unrestrained power to make law, a countervailing effort to
stake out distinctively private locales free from the encroaching power of the state
developed.151 With the expansion of the latter trend, natural rights theories were
elaborated in the seventeenth century for the purpose of setting limits on state power,
both over property and religious conscience.152 By 1934, the areas that people considered
the most valuable for mines, agriculture, forestry, water development, and other uses had
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already been appropriated.153 What were left behind (to what later became the vastly
overextended Bureau of Land Management) were those lands that the settlers considered
worthless, or at least more trouble than they were worth–res nullius, it seemed, and likely
to stay that way.154 Later on, moreover, in the early years of the conservative Burger
Court, the private sphere was further narrowed.155 In the physical world, thus far, an
interventionist theory to limit the private sphere has not prevailed and the public sphere
continued to serve as the default rule.156 Instead, Courts have identified constitutional law
with the task of defining and expanding private spheres within which individuals must be
left free from the default public domain ruled by governments.157
In cyberspace the opposing trend unmistakably has prevailed. While the physical world is
presently subject to a default rule of a continuous public sphere that is then subject to
distinct proprietary private sphere allotments, Cyberspace architecture, imbeds a different
structure. In the latter, apart from the Internet’s “public roads” or backbone transit
infrastructure, which is regulated according to telecommunications and antitrust law, the
present default rule contains a mosaic of private allotments – namely, neighboring
proprietary web sites. As pictorially put by Maureen Ryan, cyberspace has ‘no town
halls, no granges, no public squares, no downtown churches or galleries or schools’.158
Thus neither public locales nor balanced territorial privacy policy have so far been
established. Instead, only a private privacy legal rule has been adopted and too widely so.
Cyberspace’s architecture, backed by the ’hands off’ paradigm towards privacy policy at
large, has led to this deformation. In the present post-industrial society,159 where
information such as the Internet’s is a major source of wealth aggregation, what has been
the original exception seems to have become the norm.160 As Carol Rose points out, this
‘propertization’ trend did not occur in a vacuum, but rather came directly at the expense
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of what might seem to be ‘un-ownable’ diffuse resources or res communes in the tangible
world.161 Left to self-regulatory approaches, sufficient and legally protected public
locales arguably will not evolve, and an inner balance between private and public locales
and territorial privacy policy more particularly, will not be achieved.162
Second, as opposed to the physical world, with little scarcity constraint on on-line access
and use, would- be entrants to private on-line properties do not objectively value entry
more than the landowner would objectively suffer from the entry for transfer purposes
(and use). In the physical world, where such a reality exists, that means the need to both
create public roads and subsidize transfer through neighboring lots. Primarily, this led to
the development of the distinction between public and private, as private owners needed
open access. As a result, access to private locales without consent, and the creation of a
limited privilege to trespass was rarely done voluntarily, as explained. Moreover,
conditions such as emergency or physical distance often made it unusually difficult for
the landowner and would-be entrant to bargain on the conditions for entry.163 The reason
is manifest: entrants may damage crops, commit thefts, and do other mischief. That is
why open access was then added as a public rule. In cyberspace, however, there is no
need for access permission through private allotments, and thus no additional need for
particular public locales between them, has emerged. Instead, transfer between private
allotments is primarily done through ex-jurisdictional public roads in the form of
cyberspace’s backbone transit services. Gateway homepages, the entrance to private web
sites, are not dependently accessible among themselves and for that reason where not
seen as inflicting additional transfer cost to neighboring private locales. To conclude, in
cyberspace, there is no need for transfer permission between private web sites. Neither is
there an inherent technical need to subsidize transfer costs through the construction of
public locales as a mean of economizing on additional transfer costs.
Moreover, transfer costs are also lower in cyberspace whenever the transferee’s
destination is a would-be public locale. In some cases, forum providers voluntarily set
aside some area for open use within private websites (or would-be private locales), thus
diminishing the need to transfer between separate locales. Major Internet providers are
obvious candidates for the modern application of this principle, as they use their message
boards and chat rooms to foster a sense of community. Sites, such as eBay and
Amazon.com, whose purpose is strictly private e-commerce, confirm this observation.
Such is also the prevailing practice in real time "chat rooms",164 news groups,165 and
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Carol M. Rose, supra note 176, at 7; See, also, Paolo Carpignano et al., Chatter in the Age of
Electronic Reproduction: Talk Television and the "Public Mind," in The Phantom Public Sphere
93 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993), at 96-97, at 93 ((relating this pattern to the more broad influence of
mass media).
See, particularly, discussion in Part III.C.2, infra.
Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 114, at 1383-1384.
Chat rooms allow interested individuals to participate in on-line discussions in real time on a
myriad of general interest topics by sending and receiving messages via their ISP. See generally
ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36 (surveying common methods of communication on the
Internet).
Usenet news groups are a loosely organized collection of distributed bulletin boards, each one
dedicated to a particular topic. See generally ACLU v. Reno, Id (surveying common methods of

29

CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
remote information retrieval practices such as bulletin-board services and message
boards.166 Notwithstanding the significance of these new developments in cyberspace’s
boundary equilibrium, neither the present architecture of cyberspace nor the present day
United States federal governments’ technocentristic self-regulation approaches enhance
these areas to the protected legal status of public locales, nor do they act to reestablish the
balance between both types of locales, in favor of the latter. Third, in opposition to the
physical world, transaction costs generated by web sites landowners and would-be
entrants to negotiate a license or easement of entry for open public use without the use of
any licensing regimes are relatively low. As a result, with no need for their corrective
minimization, preservation of the present private allotment mosaic seems to remain
stable, while socially implying inefficient allocative results.

b.

The insufficiency of technological solutions

The lack of inner equilibrium between the different types of locales ultimately may have
enticed policy makers and theoreticians alike, to make the normative leap, which implies
that law suffers from an inherent inability to correct this anomaly. That is, as the analogy
between the Internet and a physical locale is not particularly strong,167 scientific truism
largely upholds that it is wishful thinking to assume that legally made geographic
indeterminacy could prevail.168 The recognition that the Internet is not just like the
physical world, and that the ways in which it is different may matter to the outcome of
cases, we are told, is critical.169 In fact, the United States federal government’s privacy
policy still encourages the withdrawal of law as a balancing constraint, as seen with the
FTC's stance toward online privacy, which emphasizes self-regulation via the adoption of
privacy policies.170 Arguably, technology alone, thus far, has failed to provide protection
comparable to that, which is provided in law.171 It is, at least presently, incapable of
establishing a comprehensive boundary solution by itself, for three main reasons: its
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communication on the Internet); See, also, Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953, 954 (W.D. Okla.
1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 771 (10th Cir. 1998) ("News groups are interactive 'places' on the Internet").
See, generally, ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36.
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, supra note 43, id; Josh A. Goldfoot, supra note 88, at 920 (“At best
‘cyberspace’ is a convenient term describing a set of communications achieved through the
Internet.”).
See, e.g., Reidenberg, Yahoo and democracy, supra note 89, at 274; Lawrence Lessig & Paul
Resnick, supra note 72, at 396; Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, at 344; Johnson & Post, at 1379;
Post & Johnson, Chaos Prevailing, supra note 73, Id; Post, Governing Cyberspace, at 161.
See, Maureen A. O'Rourke, supra note 43, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs, the
Physics of Time Reversal 1 (1987).
Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2041 (2000);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80
Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1995), at 508-11 [Hereinafter, ‘Reidenberg, Setting Standards’].
Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t
Get), Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001), at 79; See, Joel Reidenberg, Jennifer Barrett, Evan Hendricks,
Solveig Singleton & David Sobel, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 59, at 60; Joel R.
Reidenberg, Restoring Americans, supra note 22, at 771.
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inherent inability to self-provide with a public/private distinction, its poorly practiced
appeal and its lack of compliance with existing law.
To begin with, as a technological solution, ‘gateway’ or access-based zoning is used to
restrict only private locales ex-ante, namely proprietary web sites. In addition,
demarcation lines among network service providers such as America OnLine,
CompuServe, or Prodigy only generate important boundaries around privately owned
proprietary services. Private contractual arrangements determine the availability and the
conditions of access for network connections.172 Without a gateway, interactions are
effectively prohibited.173 In fact, technology does not support an inherent distinction
between public and private places, but instead only the further fencing of private locales,
ultimately taking no notice of the needed public ones.
Second, even for private locales this solution is poorly practiced; as it decreases the level
of accessibility and attractiveness of web sites that choose to independently fence
themselves in. As a result, as some courts have already recognized, although gateway
technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, it is not
available to all Web users, 174 and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat
rooms and USENET newsgroups.175 Gateway technology is not omnipresent in
cyberspace, and because without it there is no means of age verification, most notably,
cyberspace still remains largely unzoned--and unzoneable.176 As Court has recognized,
for user-based zoning to be effectual, an agreed-upon code (or "tag") would have to be
present; screening software or browsers with screening capabilities would have to be able
to identify the "tag"; and those programs would have to be extensively available—and
then widely used--by Internet users. At present, none of these circumstances prevail.177 It
is still the case that screening software "is not in wide use today" and "only a handful of
browsers have screening capabilities.”178 There is, furthermore, no agreed-upon "tag" for
those programs to identify.179 As a substitute, such "gateway" technology still requires
Internet users to enter identifiable information about themselves before they can access
the countless private locales of cyberspace.180
Third, strict technologically based zoning is not backed by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") protective measurements. Thus, it does not seem to invalidate
the requirement for a contractual framework in case territorial privacy is ignored.181
Originally, since the enactment of the DMCA in 1998, the Copyright Act has addressed
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Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 76, at 917.
Id, at 918;
See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 845; Shea v. Reno, 930 F.Supp. 916, 933-934
(S.D.N.Y.1996).
Id, Reno v. ACLU, at 891.
See, Id, p.846; Shea v. Reno, supra note 197, at 934.
Shea v. Reno, Id, at 945-946.
Id, at 945-946.
See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 848; Shea, supra note 197, at 945.
See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 845.
For the alternative solution based on territorial privacy, see, also, discussion in Part III.C.2.a, infra.

31

CYBERSPACE CARTOGRAPHY
access to copyrighted material as well as the scope of exclusive rights therein.182 Under
the DMCA, it is illegal to "circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected" by copyright.183 But only those access control measures that
"require the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work," are protected against circumvention.184
Most e-commerce web sites, such as eBay, contain some copyrighted material in addition
to their uncopyrighted product and pricing information. However, they do not use access
control measures protected by the DMCA, in part because such steps would discourage
entry by welcome as well as unwanted visitors.185 As a result, technological zoning
assumes a contractual relationship, whereas due to the lack sufficient will and
implementation of identification and contractual consent, such a solution is still
inefficient. A territorially based solution instead would only necessitate unilateral notice
at the entrance to on-line locales should be preferred, as it may overcome the need for
identification and contractual consent.186 As a practical matter, observance in private
locales should be replaced through a mechanism of voluntary disclosure of whichever
types of information, namely, transactional, registration and clickstream data, that would
be abided to by would-be entrants;187 In public locales, however, observance should be
freely allowed, as long as a notice of the public locale is brought forth, but then be solely
restricted to the collection of non-identifiable registration and clickstream data.188
Law, if constructed to be, can easily overcome any of these geographical discontinuities
that such digital coercion threatens to entail. Continuity in the spatial pattern of
preferences should then suggest a need to define peripheral locations in a more narrow
and gradual form, implying that such a boundary would be valuable.189 A localist
boundary theory, thus, would put emphasis on drawing boundaries that should evolve
through a case-by- case common law development in which tribunals seek guidance in
legislation and treaties. Various courts already uphold the value of this regulative
approach.190 In the physical world, this sort of dialogue between courts and lawmakers to
delineate the geographic limits is the heart of what Farber calls in the context of
international environmental law the evolutionary approach.191 In the midst of a
technological regulatory vacuum and due to the arguable sufficiency of the legal solution,
this same approach, ultimately, should hold for cyberspace.
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17 U.S.C. §1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
Id, at §1201(a)(1)(A).
Id, at §1201(a)(3)(B).
O'Rourke, Property Rights, supra note 43, at 583-584 and Fn 95 & accompanying text.
See, also, discussion in Part III.C.2.a, infra.
Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 280 (1974); see also, Ruth
Gavison, supra note 1, at 432-33.
Richard B. Parker, Id, at 280; See also, Ruth Gavison, supra note 1, Id.
See, Christopher D. Stone, supra note 44, Id.
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that
electronic signals generated by computers that minors used to access plaintiff's telephone system
were sufficiently tangible to maintain action for trespass to personal property), at 473-74
(commenting on applying common law to modern facts); See also CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (relying on Thrifty-Tel for support in
finding electronic signals sufficient for trespass to chattels action).
See, Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1273; Christopher D. Stone, supra note 44, Id.
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c.

The sufficiency of legal solutions

A functional subsistence of such a distinction between a public and a private sphere or
locales of human activity, primarily, is a central tenet of jurisprudence in liberal
democracy.192 The appearance of capitalist market relations as a self-regulating economic
system has enhanced the centrality of private individualism that was then fenced against
public intrusions. Overall, in Western democracies, it was market growth that shaped
political and legal interactions between both spheres.193 Notably, in the present service
economy, information has become an increasingly valuable commodity.194 That
development eventually penetrated also the various legal fields and became impossible to
ignore.195 Notably, as a legal concern, the private/public distinction also came to be
192

193

194

195

For U.S. Federal courts upholding the difference between public sphere and private sphere, see,
e.g., See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (discussing human activity in
terms of public and private spheres) (citing United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir.
1981)); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting distinction between
activity in public and private spheres). See, also, Robert H. Mnookin, supra note 149, at 1429
(noting distinction between public and private spheres relating to individual rights vis-a-vis
government powers).
See, primarily, Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination. New York: George Braziller (1973);
Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press (1975);
Andrew Fraser, The Legal Theory We Need Now, 1978 Socialist Review 147 (1978); Ellen
Wood, Ellen Meiksins, The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism, 127 New
Left Review 66 (1981).
Patricia Mell, supra note 112, at 26-41 (While information has always been a core resource
(referring to Anthony G. Oettinger, Information Resources: Knowledge and Power in the 21st
Century, 209 Science 191, 191 (1980))
For different legal applications regarding the distinction, see, e.g., Karl Klare, E., The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358 (1982) (showing how the
public/private distinction is used in historical studies of legal change); Isaac Balbus, Commodity
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 Law & Society
Review 571(1977) (for a social science approach to the relationship between political economy
and the public/private distinction in law);
For a critical view of this movement see Duncan Kennedy, supra note 151 (for an internal critique
of the public/private dichotomy in legal discourse). Any progress with this paper’s claims would
first confront Duncan Kennedy's notable critique of the public/private initial dichotomy. In
retrospective, Kennedy’s claim remained a cry in the wilderness. As Ellickson concludes, all
analysts now agree that it is important to uphold the private/public distinction. See, also, Robert C.
Ellickson, supra note 114, at 1381 et. al. Moreover, even Kennedy himself has reconsidered this
approach. See Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984).
Nevertheless, in response to Kennedy’s critique, two central observations could be made. First,
based on his normatively-neutral two-stage test, Kennedy upholds that he never inherently denies
the distinction’s normative potential to survive the test. Instead, Kennedy’s argument is positive to
suggest that such a distinction is no more practical in the current legal system, and should thus not
prevail. This is based on the view that the range of distinctions that characterize liberal legality,
"state/society, individual/group, right/power, contract/tort, law/policy, legislative/judiciary,
objective/subjective, reason/fiat, freedom/coercion" are all going through "similar processes of
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known for its application on questions of legal jurisdiction, examining the mechanisms
by which legal boundaries can be established and altered.196
In a seminal study on the public sphere, Carol Rose indicates that in the American legal
tradition there were largely three types of theories to justify public locales, originally as
in the constituting waterfront beach cases.197 The first is a theory of 'custom,' where the
public asserts ownership of property under some claim so ancient that it antedates any
memory to the contrary.198 Clearly, network environments such as the Internet are far too
young to give rise to such ancient claims, such that antedates any memory to the contrary.
Nevertheless, there is no inherent reason to assume that such a claim could not evolve in
cyberspace in the long future. Second is a prescriptive or dedicatory theory, by which a
period of public usage gives rise to an implied grant or gift from private owners;199 In
cyberspace such a theory might turn to be too limited in scope to undermine the ability
and incentives of website owners to explicitly limit privacy protection by giving notice of
a public sphere, and thus tortuously unobtrusive. The third is a 'public trust' theory, to the
effect that the public always has rights of access to the property in question, and that any
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decline", at 1349, 1350, Id. At least on this factual ground Kennedy’s argument might seem to be
too adventurous. See, e.g., Seidenman, arguing, in fact, that during the Lochner era an assumption
of “natural” boundary was made in the Supreme Court. See, Louis Michael Seidman, supra note
159, at 1006; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); For a supporting survey of the era, see G.
Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, supra note 179, at 739-41.
Second, kennedy is inherently not concerned with the exact substance of each sphere, but then
assumes their practical existance. See, e.g., at 1350. Thus, in his somewhat tautologous structure,
separate spheres, such as individual/group, right/power, contract/tort, may nevertheless exist as
long as no boundary is put in place between them. Arguably, once separation in content between
spheres exists, albeit vague or otherwise clear, any justification in ignoring the existence of
boundary in between should only be possible in marginal extreme situations. See, also, discussion
in Part III.B.1, hereafter.
See, e.g., Jeff Weintraub, supra note 159, at 9; Gerald E. Frug, supra note 172, Id.
See, Curtis J. Berger, supra note 112, at 655-659.
Carol Rose, The comedy of the commons: Custom, commerce, and inherently public, 53 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 711, at 714 [Hereinafter, ‘Rose, The comedy of the commons’] & Fn. 16, referring to
Courts in Florida, Hawaii, and Oregon have adopted this approach. See City of Daytona Beach,
294 So. 2d 73 (Fla.); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968); Thornton, 462
P.2d 671 (Or.).
See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 714 & Fn. 15, referring to California's Gion, 465
P.2d 50. Other states in which courts have recently applied the 'implied dedication' or prescriptive
approach to the waterfront are Texas, in Seaway Co., 375 S.W.2d 923, and--somewhat reluctantly-New York, in Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
1972), aff'd, 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) (mem.). Cf. Department of Natural
Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975) (doctrine held inapplicable
because no clear intent to dedicate); State v. Beach Co., 271 S.C. 425, 248 S.E.2d 115 (1978) (no
intent to dedicate). For commentary, see, for example, Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's
Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 669 (1983); Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An
Alternative to Implied Dedication, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 795 (1971); Note, This Land Is My Land:
The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1092 (1971).
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private rights are subordinate to the public's 'trust' rights;200 Carol Rose calls such lands
"inherently public property”.201 In the physical world, the American legal system has
strongly suggested that some kinds of property should not be held exclusively in private
hands, but should be open to the public or at least subject to what Roman law called the
'jus publicum,' or the 'public right.'202 Upholding the “Inherently public property” (jus
publicum) doctrine, for this public to claim property, two elements were essential: first,
the property had to be capable of monopolization by private persons, or would have been
without doctrines securing public access against such threats.203 Second, the public's
claim had to be superior to that of the private owner, because the properties themselves
were most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons--by the
public at large.204 Courts have become receptive to requests to extend this technique to
preserve a public sphere beyond its traditional water-related focus. The public trust
doctrine has been invoked to support claims for the preservation of any number of types
of property deemed public resources including parks,205 marshlands,206 archeological
sites,207 etc. In accordance with this result, Courts have distinctively adhered to public
places as ex-jurisdictional locations for private excludability.
In the digital era, without acknowledging a separate public sphere there is no ‘place’
left for unilateral non-identifiable data collection, for either non-commercial or
commercial purposes alike. Policymaking should now further legitimize the expansion
of information collection in public locales in cyberspace. As explained, the only way to
balance that activity with private territorial privacy protection policies, as it is balanced
in the physical world, would be to uphold distinctive public and private locales. In that
200
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See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 714 & Fn. 14, referring to State v. Superior Court,
29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865; City of Berkeley,
606 P.2d 362; Van Ness, 393 A.2d 571; Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47; Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); Just v.
Marinette Country, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (1972).
For physical world context, Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged
Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L. J. 762 (1970); Note, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending
the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1049, 1069-86 (1981). For
cyberspace context, see, also, Maureen Ryan, supra note 181, Id; Molly S. van Houweling,
Cultivating Open Information Platforms: A Land Trust Model, 1 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L.
309 (2002).
Carol Rose, The comedy of the commons, Id, at 720.
See, Rose, The comedy of the commons, at 715-716 and relevant footnotes for additional source,
especially Fn. 10 & accompanying text:, referring to Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law
in American Legal History, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 217 (1984); Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in
American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1403. For the 'jus publicum'
(or 'publici juris') language, see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 76 (1851),
discussed in Scheiber, supra, at 222.
Id, Rose, The comedy of the commons, at 774.
Id, at 774.
See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); Wade v. Kramer, 459
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass.
1966).
See, e.g., Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
See, e.g., San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1978) (holding that the public trust doctrine cannot be extended to cover archeological
remains located on private property).
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regard, the claim that certain portions of cyberspace deserve or would require a public
on-line locale status should become compelling.208

2.

Consciousness of Falsity

Alternatively to a legal function, such as non-material locales, being a statement
propounded with a recognition of utility – a legal fiction may incur complete or partial
consciousness of its falsity. In the Anglo-American jurisprudence it is widely
acknowledged that no court, should base a decision solely on cognitive science if doing
so would exclude the different values of the law, such as fairness and justice to the
litigants.209 This should arguably, be also the experience of formalizing a localist
boundary theory for cyberspace based on a legal fiction of locales. In continuation, there
are two distinctions that narrow the subject matter of any legal fictions. The first is the
distinction between a fiction and a lie.210 A fiction is distinguished from a lie by the fact
that it is not meant to deceive.211 The user of a legal fiction does not intend to produce
belief in those who hear or read it. Neither should a user of a legal fiction herself believe
the false statement. It is probably the case that, thus far, no such intentional lie was
introduced into the boundary theory discourse regarding on-line spatiality. This
distinction is, therefore less relevant to the present framework. The second and more
relevant to cyberspace’s spatiality discussion is the distinction between a fiction and an
erroneous conclusion.212 A fiction is generally distinguished from an erroneous
conclusion or scientific hypothesis by the fact that its author adopts it with knowledge of
its falsity.213 In such cases, the author of the legal fiction "either positively disbelieves it
or is partially conscious of its untruth or inadequacy."214 Along the lines of this
distinction, scientific truism has given rise to many commentators in criticizing Courts
for applying the doctrine of trespass to chattel, most notably, to cyberspace.215 Evidently,
no statement, describing either the physical world or network environments can
adequately describe reality. Fuller reserved the label of "false," however, only for those
statements that are outstanding or unusual in their inadequacy.216 Once the label of
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David J. Goldstone, supra note 42, at 3.
See, e.g., New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 197, 43 S.Ct. 270, 275, 67 L.Ed. 605
(1923); Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 257 U.S. 563,
579, 42 S.Ct. 232, 234, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922). See, also, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, William and
Mary Law Review 525 (1984), at 525-526.
L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 7. See, also, Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 92 S.Ct. 637 U.S. Fla. 1972. Decided Jan. 12, 1972; 405 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 929 (Reversed
and remanded) (rejecting a jurisprudential approach that meets the standard at law, but it is
technologically unsound), p. 459. See, also, discussion at Part II.C.1.b, infra.
Id.
Id.
Id.
L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 8.
Hunter, supra note 43; Maureen A. O’Rourke, supra note 43, at 595-97; Dan Burk, The Trouble
With Trespass, at 34 [Hereinafter, ‘Burk, The Trouble With Trespass’].
L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 11-12.
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"false" has attached, and the statement has been made with no intent to deceive, we have
a legal fiction.217 Accordingly, a statement must be false before it can be a fiction.
This perception of truth is relative and pragmatic. The legal truth of any statement is
merely a question of its adequacy, whether it comes close to describing reality. Finally,
rested upon the user's recognition of the statement's falsity, a distinction between benign
and "dangerous" legal fiction becomes useful. The "danger" of a legal fiction varies
inversely with the acuteness of the awareness that the assumption is false. In other words,
a legal fiction is "wholly safe" only when the statement is used with "complete
consciousness of its falsity".218 Fuller considered such a legal fiction benign.219 On the
other hand, a legal fiction becomes "dangerous" only if the user is unaware of the falsity
of the statement. One way to avoid this "danger" is for the user of the legal fiction to
embellish it with a grammatical motif of its falsity, such as to propose that technically
locales do not subsist on-line, or to say that their existence, instead, is legally fictional.
The latter approach could be then justified either because technology is not capable or
partly technically immature enough to uphold on-line spatiality or self-regulated
differentiated locales, in their strict scientific sense, as is presently the case in
cyberspace.220
Even if a legal fiction of on-line locales is finally agreed upon, technically it might still
be incapable of defining exact jurisdictional boundaries between different locales. As
acknowledged for the present proprietary-based information privacy analysis in
cyberspace, the idea that an individual has a protected right in controlling disclosure of
use of personal information directly conflicts with the concept of public distribution of
information.221 Yet, as important as it for a legal system to make an effort to locate this
exact jurisdictional boundary, whether or not finding that exact location is possible and
should be a finite goal, it is yet more imminent for a liberal democratic society to agree
on the existance of such a distinction in the first place.222 Thus, even the ambiguity
regarding the appropriate location of a boundary between locales is not a unique concern
to the digital era.223 Occasionally, even before the information age, it has been a source of
controversy.224 Since the realist movement in American jurisprudence in the 1930's,225
the boundary's ambiguity has become increasingly obvious.226 In dealing with this issue,
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On the institutional explanation for this argument, see discussion in Part III.C.2, infra.
See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, supra note 1, ¶ 8.05.
See, e.g., Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1132.
See, e.g., Patricia Mell, supra note 112, at. 4, 22.
See, Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1429 (1982), at 1430-34 (discussing various definitions of dividing line
between public and private spheres).
For a general description of the realist challenge to formalism that began in the 1920's, see
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The politics of law: A progressive critique
26-29 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
For discussions of the current ambiguity surrounding the public/private distinction, see Papers
from the University of Pennsylvania Law Review on the Public/Private Distinction Held at the
University of Pennsylvania on January 20, 1982, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 1289-1602 (1982); Duncan
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it should be clear at the outset that the system will never operate as cleanly as do the rules
governing property rights on land.227 As Richard Epstein points out, for land disputes it is
generally clear when one person has crossed the boundary that separates his or her
property from another.228 The definition and identification of appropriate boundaries is
never as clear in disputes over privacy.229
This legal intricacy only continued the tension that existed in earlier telecommunications
systems.230 Especially notable is the merging of telephone and television with computers
that has resulted in the development of a flexible and diverse international informationexchange system which allowed the nearly instantaneous transfer of information through
cables, satellites, microwave relays and fiber optics.231 Nevertheless, simply by
maintaining a positivistic right to privacy, both initially uphold the constituting
framework of jurisdictional boundaries and thus the need for an inner balance between
private and public rationales.232 Thus, even accepting these certainty limitations, it is
possible to make some measurable progress to a sensible end.233 Instead of offering
reconciliation, constitutional law allows us to live with contradiction by establishing a
shifting, uncertain, and contested boundary between distinct public and private locales
within which conflicting values can be separately nurtured.234 The legal fiction of on-line
locales, can, thus, still be seen benign assuming that it is to be still stated in complete
consciousness of its falsity.
Conceptually, the incorporation of a new legal fiction to cyberspace’s boundary theory
should be seen as a general legal standard. The use of fictions or presumptions is, indeed,
very popular in American jurisprudence and should therefore not be considered
extraneous or passé by cyber lawyers.235 Presumptions, and the associated burdens of
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Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349
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See, Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting it Back Together Again, In The
Right to Privacy, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul eds., (Cambridge
University Press, 2000) 1, at 7
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Daniel Bell, Communications Technology--For Better or for Worse, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
May-June 1979, at 20, at 21.
Id.
For the view suggesting that the private/public distinction involves especially questions of
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, In
Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a grand Dichotomy (Jeff Weintraub
and Krishan Kumar, eds) (University of Chicago press, 1997) 1, at 9.
See, Richard A. Epstein, supra note 151, at 7.
Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, Yale L.J. 1006 (1987), at 1007.
For the leading scholarship on Legal Fictions are, G. Calabresi, Ideals, beliefs, attitudes, and the
law: Private law perspectives on a public law problem (1985); G. Calabresi, A common law for
the age of statutes 172-77 (1982); Abrams, A Constitutional Law for the Age of Anxiety (Book
Review), 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1643 (1985); Block, Suits Against Government Officials and the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946); Note, Penumbras and Privacy: A
Study of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-Making, 89 W. VA. L. Rev. 859 (1985);
Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17
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proof necessary to overcome them, presently appear virtually everywhere in law.236 In
property law, for example, a specific legal fiction is the presumption that one who owned
soil owned all the way to the heavens and to the depths.237 In employment discrimination
litigation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the burden of evidentiary
production (and thus the applicable presumption) can shift to the defendant if the plaintiff
was a qualified (but rejected) applicant and a member of a historically oppressed
group.238 In constitutional law, the equal protection doctrine implicitly operates as a
presumption, requiring a court to determine a "level of scrutiny" to apply to a challenged
statutory or regulatory classification.239 In corporate law a separate legal personality has
been fictitiously constructed for corporations.240 A legal fiction is commonly seen as an
assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law, such as
differentiated private and public on-line locales, has undergone alteration, such as in
cyberspace, yet its letter remained unchanged.241 Thus the fiction of “inviting” in the
“attractive nuisance” cases is intended to escape the rule that there is no duty of care
toward entrants.242 The ubiquity of presumptions has led a number of prominent
commentators and judges to posit that most rules of law are little more than
presumptions, subject to rebuttal by the adversely affected party.243 There are truly few
absolute principles in law.244 Those principles that may appear to be absolute are, in
reality, presumptions, which may be overcome in appropriate circumstances.245
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Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 627 (1994). For some reason, however, interest cooled
down until the 1920's when Roscoe Pound, John Chipman Gray, and Lon Fuller reawakened this
dormant jurisprudential technique. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, Yale L. J. (1990) 1, at 11.
See R. Pound, Interpretations of legal history 131 (1923); L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 1;
Wilkinson, J. Harvie III., Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions," 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 907
(1992), at 907; Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 871 (Summer, 1986), at
872, 875; Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presumption, 16 J. L. ECON.
ORG (April 2000) 1, at 2.
C. Donahue, JR., T. Kauper, & P. Martin, Cases and materials on property 291 (1974). See
generally W. Empson, Seven types of ambiguity (1930), and the extensive work by Owen
Barfield, including in particular, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in O. Barfield, The rediscovery
of meaning, and other essays 44 (1977).
See, McDonell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See, Gunther, Gerald, and Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law (1998). Lon Fuller reminds us of
many more examples, such as constructive delivery in contract law. See, L. Fuller, supra note 131,
at 15; and implied provisions in contracts. L. Fuller, Id, at 8.
Scores of studies were made on the nature of legal personality. For a handy bibliography of
nineteenth-century foreign treatises, see Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253,
254 n.3 (1911); see, also, John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personalty,
35 Yale L. J. 655 (1926); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a
Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563 (1987).
Maine, Ancient Law, in The problem of jurisprudence 371 (L. Fuller ed. 1946) (chapter reprints
first half of H. Maine, Ancient law (1861)). In referring to the fictions of Roman law, and to some
of the older, jurisdictional common law fictions, Maine wrote, "The fact is in both cases that the
law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was." Id. at 370. Pound
was the most expansive of all, including in his definition of legal fiction interpretation, equity, and
natural law. See, Pound, supra note 161, at 131; L. Fuller, Supra note 131, at 53.
L. Fuller, id, at 53.
Wilkinson, J. Harvie, supra note 161, at 907.
Id.
Id, at 907, 908.
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Arguably, the time has come for theoreticians and policy makers alike to reevaluate the
present anti-globalists and globalist paradigms of cyberspace and ultimately integrate
territorial privacy to on-line privacy jurisprudence at large. Thus, the arguable
recognition of on-line locales within their meaning in localist boundary theory, could still
comply with physical world’s notion of geographic spatiality, it being a configuration of
multiple physical locales, subject to a functional differentiation such as the public/private
distinction.
C.

A three criteria classification scheme:

A fiction or a presumption, if it is to escape the charge of ‘erroneous conclusion’ or ‘lie,’
must then comply with three requirements.246 First, it must be be based on an inference
justified by common experience, based on absence of other proof and as drawn from
available evidence.247 Second, it must be phrased in realistic terms; order, not an
“inference”, but a disposition of the case in a certain contingency.248 Lastly, be freely
rebuttable.249 This part will analyze these three conditions, while overcoming the
constituting globalist and anti-globalist boundary claims in opposition to the possibility
of legally acknowledging on-line locales in cyberspace.

1.
a)

Based on an inference justified by common experience
Absence of other proof

The first among the two conditions a fiction or a presumption must be based on as an
inference justified by common experience is that it has to be based on an absence of
other proof.250 The lack of other proof does not have to be determined by the standard of
certainty, but rather by a more relative test, known as the substantial-evidence test.251
Sometimes the reason for tolerating a gap either between evidence and findings or
between findings and decision has to do with limitations of human intellects or
limitations on the magnitude of investigations that may be conducted in particular
circumstances. In application of this standard, courts have already acknowledged that
based on what is known and uncontradicted by empirical evidence--may in and of itself
be 'substantial evidence' when first-hand evidence on the question is unavailable. That
is, even in an analogous concern to cyberspace’s spatial discourse, such as when
upholding interstate commerce based on the evidential question of how electricity
actually moves in a bus.252 In balance, though, not all propositions of fact that is useful
and used in the administrative process are susceptible of proof with evidence.253
246
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248
249
250
251
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L. Fuller, supra note 131, at 45 et al.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra note 135, at. 465-466.
Id.
See, e.g., FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 209 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 644, 647, 11
L.Ed.2d 638 (1964); Travelers' Indemnity Co. v. Parkersburg Iron & Steel Co., 70 F.2d 63, 64
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Overcoming the constituting globalist and anti-globalist boundary claims against the
possibility of legally acknowledging on-line locales, is made here in two levels. A form
of heterogeneity involving the requirement of a physical presence threatens the first
weakness of the homogenous definition of space in its globalist boundary theory sense.
Arguably, localist boundary theory may overcome the physical world’s wrong analogy
upheld as scientific truism, which suggests that locales and the physical nexus of
individuals to them most be physical.254 The second weakness of the homogenous
globalist boundary sense that may overcome by a form of heterogeneity involves the
concern over discontinuities in the ability to interact between other spaces, namely the
physical world and among inner locations.255 Localist boundary theory applied through a
legal fiction of an on-line locale may arguably entail the existence of relations between
locales – yet, without intrinsically involving geographical continuation, as will be
explained herein.256

1)
i.

First heterogeneity: Physical presence
Non-physical locality

Localist boundary theory is confronted with the wrong notion of the physical world that
locales and the physical nexus of individuals to them must be physical. For a start, in
regard to locales, we are told, although data has been traveling on wires and through the
airwaves for centuries, the television, the telegraph, or the telephone are not "places"
within which people travel.257 In analogy, to previous telecommunications networks, we
are told, most Internet users access the Internet through a dial-up modem, converting
digital data to analog sounds that can be sent over a telephone line just like the human
voice.258 There were computer networks before the Internet that similarly relied on
telephonic exchange of data.259 Based on what is also a common view among post
modernistic critical geographers concerning the notion of virtual space, - Space is not a
container but a medium, in which “Television space” is like “Cyberspace” – both don’t
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(1934); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 808 (1951) aff'd, 345 U.S. 153, 73
S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953). See, also, 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1917--1929, 1976 (3d ed.
1940 and Supp. 1970).
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set of points within it. P. Haggett, supra note 126, at 40-55. In non-physical environments,
political geography therefore allows us to uphold a one-point locale that, in essence, becomes nonphysical. The emphasis on physical presence naturally originates in the physical world’s
application of localist boundary theory. See, Daniel A. Farber, supra note 44, at 1270; Soja, A
paradigm, at 53. See, also, discussion, herein.
See, e.g., Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, supra note 51, at 9.
Id.
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Control Revolution: How the Internet Is Putting Individuals in Charge
and Changing the World We Know (1999), at 710-712 (cyberspace is not a real place but just a
medium that we may control) [hereinafter, ‘Shapiro, The Control Revolution’]; Shapiro, The
Disappearance of at 709 and see Fn. 21 & accompanying text; Timothy Wu, When Law & the
Internet First Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171 (1999-2000).
For a discussion of the prevalence of private “bulletin board systems” in the late 1980s and early
1990s, see, e.g., Debra B. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New First
Amendment Standard, 9 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 87, 91-92 (1995).
Id.
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exist as spaces, but instead as communications mediums.260 Support for the physicality of
locales, in fact, originates in public international law; which upholds that even the
smallest ‘area of land’ must be ‘natural’ land as such that is capable of legal
appropriation.261 To be capable of appropriation an island territory, in fact, must present
at high tide a surface of land clear of the water, which is large enough to be habitable in
practice.262 In resemblance to cyberspace scientific truism, this pragmatic notion of
placeless seems to have led some public international law scholars in the physical world
all the way to insist that the islands must also be shown on geographical maps.263
Adopting a not less pragmatic approach, however, the Anglo-American legal system, has
consistently acknowledged alternative non-physical forms of discontinuous localized
spatiality, and in various constitutional contexts. In seminal First Amendment cases such
as Perry264 and Cornelius,265 in the course of declaring them non-public forums, court
went on identifying the relevant locales as a school district's internal mail system and a
charity fund drive among federal employees, respectively, notwithstanding that each
"lacks a physical situs.”266 In another context, in United States v. Grace,267 the Court
divided the Supreme Court grounds into perimeter sidewalks and interior grounds,268
relying on the sidewalks' functional continuity with the adjoining streets269 and
indistinguishability from other public walkways.270 Constitutional criminal law also has
transcended the notion that privacy is defined only by physical boundaries. In essence,
the 'public sphere' refers not to a locale as such but to a fictitious sphere, in which a set of
activities constitutes a democratic society's self-reflection and self-governance. In a
public sphere, private persons come together to discuss, deliberate, and decide public
questions. Recognition of a fictitious locale was instead made functional. Any remaining
doubts that such a functionally defined locale could qualify as a public forum were
dispelled in Rosenberger,271 where the Court characterized the university's student
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Shapiro, The Control Revolution, supra note 243 (for the legal perspective), at 710-712; Timothy
Wu, supra note 243 (same). See, also, Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion
of Space in Critical Social Theory (1989) (For the political geography perspective).
Article 121 of the Montego Bay Convention of 10 December 1982 uses a geological criterion, ‘a
naturally area of land’. Artificial islands are indeed excluded. Even here, however, the debates at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea revealed the great complexity of this
alleged pragmatic legal interpretation of locales. Thus, the nature of the area of land, and therefore
the ability to use it, matters little. ‘Mud, slit, coral, sand, madrepore, rocks, etc. anything makes an
island’. See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands
(Kluwer law international, 1996), at 22, referring to Laurent Lucchini & Michel Voelckel, Droit de
la mer, vol. I (Paris, Pedone, 1990), at 331.
International Court of Justice, 1953, at 49, 53.
See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 247, at 22, referring to Gilbert Gidel, La mer
territoriale at la zone contig e, (1934) Recueil des Courts de l’Academie de Droit International, II,
vol. 48, at 137-278.
Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Id, at 801.
461 U.S. 171 (1983).
Id, at 179-80.
Id, at 180.
Id, at 179.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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activity funding system as "open[ing] a limited forum"272 and declared that "[t]he SAF is
a forum….more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same
principles are applicable”.273 With this jurisprudential shift in emphasis from what was,
up till then, perceived as a classic physical analysis towards a more functional one –
locales are indeed apparent today as fora that do not always have to be physical gathering
places.274

The notion of ‘territorial trap’ as posited by John Agnew has been an important statement
in this respect. Agnew argues that territory, in its traditional fixed and finite sense as
determined by rigid boundaries, should not be the focus for political geographical
analysis. It is important not to fall into the trap of understanding territoriality as
automatically entailing ‘the practices of total mutual exclusion which the dominant
understanding of the territorial state attributes to it’.275 The legal concern revolving
accessibility to locales would therefore be the question of where access can be allowed
and what a would-be entrant can do with the information retrieved, instead of who should
be eligible to access locales for collection purposes, as under- or over-inclusively
permitted by their lawful owners. Whenever such functionally based analysis entails (and
only then), there must be no inherent objection to why should our legal system not
fictitiously expand the notion of locales into other virtual realms, such as cyberspace.

ii.

Imperfect geographic nexus

The physical presence prerequisite has also been overcome in regard to the geographic
nexus requirement. In the physical world, that predominantly has been the case in
standing to sue in environmental and land use cases in the federal courts.276 Initially, in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, for example, the Supreme Court required a
“geographic nexus” between the injured plaintiff and the specific area endangered by
272
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Id, at 829. The Court uses the term "limited" or "designated" forum to denote a forum that, at least
for a class of speech that may be limited by speaker and/or subject matter, will be treated as a
"public forum." Id; ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). See infra Part II.A.2.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, at 830.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 132
L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (public place was regarded here in a “functional” form instead of a
“geographic” one); See, also, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Newman, From Moribund Backwater, supra note 97, at 16, referring to J. Agnew & S. Corbridge,
Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy (London: Routledge,
1995), p. 79. Peter Tylor, as it relates to the state and the organization of non-physical power, also
discusses the alternative understandings of territory, in his rejection of traditional physical notion
of ‘territorial absolutism’. See, David Newman, at 16, Id, referring to P.J. Tylor, Territorial
absolutism and its evasions, Geography research forum, 16.
The nexus requirement originated in Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See, also, United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973); See
generally, also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, §§ 3-15 to -17 (3rd ed. 2000),
and primarily § 3-17, at 392-424.
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agency action, even though the Court couched its argument regarding the nexus’s degree
of specificity in terms of "actually affected, without exhausting the forms of causality to
physical ones.277 In continuation, in its discussion of the requirement of injury in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court intimated that the degree of specificity of the
nexus requirement can be satisfied in many non-physical forms of causation, by a direct
link between one's demonstrated work with ("vocational nexus") or interest in an
endangered animal ("animal nexus") or habitat ("ecosystem nexus") and an agency's
pending action.278
Further non-physical expansion of the nexus’ specificity followed in Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma.279 Distinguishing the National Wildlife Federation's specificity
requirement, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the “geographic nexus”
requirement despite their inability to specify threatened areas because the proposed
development areas had not yet been determined.280 In their dissent in Defenders, Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor further espoused and advanced the ecosystem nexus theory,
acknowledging "(m)any environmental injuries…cause harm distant from the area
immediately affected by the challenged action… such as rivers running long geographical
courses."281 Likewise, the dissent impliedly endorsed the "animal nexus" theory in
stating, "Environmental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical
ranges."282 The imperfect nexus between geographically compact districts or locales and
communities of interest was finally acknowledged in Prosser v. Elections Board,283 in
which the district court adopted its own apportionment plan for Wisconsin. Judge Posner
held there that there is not a complete correlation between geographical propinquity and
community of interests.284 In support of this imperfect nexus-requirement the courts,
instead, warns us against the possible results of rigid scientific truism, suggesting that the
achievement of perfect contiguity and compactness would only imply ruthless disregard
for other elements of homogeneity; and would require breaking up counties, towns,
villages, wards, even neighborhoods.285 To conclude, with this jurisprudential shift in
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Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that persons
suing to enforce National Environmental Policy Act requirements must show a sufficient
geographical nexus to the site of a challenged project).
Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2154.
Id. (citing, for example, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992). Id. at 861-62.
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1994).
Prosser, supra note 268, at 863. See, also, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F.
Supp. 21, 28 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973))
(rejecting the Government's argument that "many of the alleged environmental effects of the
NAFTA on the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (§ 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994)) are too
widespread to be confined to a particular geographical location." In support, the district court held
that "the absence of a geographic nexus does not defeat a claim of standing because that 'would
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by
nobody"'), Id.
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emphasis from what was, up till then, perceived as a classic physical analysis towards a
more functional one – locales and the physical nexus of individuals to them are indeed
apparent today as interrelated fora that do not always have to be physical.

2)

Second heterogeneity: Discontinuity

The second weakness of the homogenous definition of space in its globalist boundary
theory sense is threatened by a form of heterogeneity involving discontinuities in the
ability to interact between other spaces, namely the physical world and among inner
locations.286 From a legal perspective it entails the existence of relations between locales,
yet without intrinsically involving geographical continuation.287 This lack of continuous
homogeneity, ultimately, upholds the legal notions of territory and borders.288 Firstly,
through the definition of territory - the political definition of a space that constitutes the
core of geopolitical analysis.289 It also wove together areal and spatial analysis through
the concept of a spatial system – a segment of space (real or hypothetical), which is
formally and functionally organized through a patterning of attributes and a structuring of
interactions. A system of settlements or central locales, for example, would consist of
locations tied together by certain shared or complementary attributes (e.g., size,
proximate location, types of services performed, socio-cultural features) and the
structuring of interactions between them (e.g., flow of money, influence, people, goods
and information).290 Secondly, borders are divided up by lawyers and geographers into
the related concepts of boundaries and frontiers. More relevant to the easily demarcable
potential locales in network environments - by IP addresses and gatekeeping technology,
are boundaries (and thus boundary-making). These are the lines that demarcate territorial
compartments, be they states, urban neighborhoods or group turfs, within which human
activity takes place and is differentiated.291 By drawing boundaries around space
286
287
288
289
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291

See, e.g., supra note 51, at 9.
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See, e.g., Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson, supra note 51, at 9.
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“territories” with specific boundaries. P. Haggett, Locational analysis of human geography
(London: Arnold, 1965), at 40-55. Thus, operationally, the extent of a territory can be defined in
terms of control and occupancy, whereas field is defined in terms of movement, without the caveat
of ownership. Id. In cyberspace, it is largely agreed that all websites (as potential locales) are
owned, easily demarcable and thus, at least theoretically could be subjected to some level of
control. They should, therefore, be more closely related to the analysis of territories than that of
fields. See, also, discussion at Part III.C.2, infra.
Soja, A paradigm supra note 45, at 53.
Prescott, Political geography (Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), at 54, 61-74 [Hereinafter, ‘Prescott,
Political geography’]; Suzanne Lalonde, supra note 124, at 8 and mentioned sources; J.R.V.
Prescot, Political frontiers and boundaries (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), at 36 [Hereinafter,
‘Prescot, Political frontiers’]; L.K.D Kristof, supra note 124, at 127; T. Cresswell, In place, out of
place: Geography, ideology and transgression (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), at 149. In
the physical world, with no appropriate analogy to network environments, Borderland is then ‘the
transition zone within which the boundary lies’. See Prescot, Political frontiers supra note 124, at
13-14.
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considered theirs, people (and nations) strive to transform space into locales.292 Such
boundaries are described in words or a treaty, shown on a map, or marked on the ground
by physical indicators.293
In opposition to acknowledging both inner and outer borders in cyberspace, scientific
truism largely upholds today that “in the strict technological sense”294 there is no
empirical support for the spatiality paradigm,295 and courts, thus far, provided none.296
Instead, a number of courts have made the mistake of overlooking the differences
between the Internet and real space in a variety of contexts, such as when the doctrine of
trespass to chattels to email and Web site access was applied, while assuming inner
bordering.297 Whenever Internet trespass cases create this analogy, courts have in fact
only made a mistaken conceptual leap, by assuming that Cyberspace is a place in its
traditional physical sense.298 Neither, are we often told, is there empirical support for the
notion of Cyberspace’s “separateness” through outer bordering from physical space.299
These observations are, nevertheless, minor from the individual’s perspective that entails
human behavior which legal truth regulates, regardless of the choice of legal fictions, on
two levels. First, already in the physical world, discontinuity is not an obstacle against the
proprietariness concerning both the existence of proximity to locales upon their type and
use. Notably, in public international law the history of claims of intrinsic sovereignty of
national groups over island territories, the argument based on geographical proximity has
never been recognized, as constituting a rule of international law in favor of the state
whose territory lies closest to the disputed islands.300 In the physical world, these
observations are also minor concerning the type and use of the neighboring locale. In
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1; Alfred C. Yen, western Frontier of Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace,
17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1207 (2002), at 1216.
See, Dan Hunter, supra note 43, at 472; Mark Lemley, supra note 43.
For courts applying the doctrine of trespass to chattels to the Internet, see, e.g., America Online v.
National Health Care Discount, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Oyster Software, Inc.
v. Forms Processing, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. 2001); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), review
granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). For early use of the trespass doctrine to computers, see, e.g.,
People v. Versaggi, 83 N.Y.2d 123, 129 (1994) (noting the New York state legislation proscribing
computer trespass, Penal Law § 156.10). But see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV
99-7654, 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000); Express One Int'l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53
S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App. 2001).
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 43 (criticizing the courts’ application of the cyberspace as place
metaphor); O’Rourke, Analogy, supra note (criticizing courts for creating a broad property right
on information for network environments), pp. 595-97; Burk, The Trouble With Trespass
(criticizing courts ignoring the damage requirement of trespass to chattels to network
environments), p. 34.
See, O'Rourke, Property Rights’, supra note 43, at 592 and Fn. 62, referring to Robert G. Sachs,
supra note 90, at 1.
See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 247, at 27-29 and Fn. 20-23 & accompanying text.
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fact, discontinuation between locales due to ‘spot zoning’ or a zoning ordinance, which
creates a small island of property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed
on the surrounding property, are part and parcel of land use.301 It is of social and private
interest to the parties involved in its use, and whenever there is a reasonable basis to treat
the spot-zoned property differently from the surrounding property, spot zoning is valid.302
Like in the physical world, on-line territorial privacy could be upheld in private locales
that are spotted inside publicly owned locales, such as public telephone booth,303 women
employees’ public restrooms owned by their employer304 or a public restroom in a
skating ring.305 Arguably, there is no inherent justification to limit the recognition of
discontinuity between fictional locales in cyberspace, where such have even less inherent
physical constriction on access to present on-line locales, based on gatekeeping
technology, and their use by users in the first place.
Second, discontinuity can be overcome by localist boundary theory also based on
analogous experience among network environments that predated cyberspace. In
international monetary wiring networks, the format and order in which information is
stored does not diminish its tangibility and logical retrieval, whenever it is assembled and
presented to the user as cohesive essence. There as well, the appropriate nature of data
storage is of marginal physical spatial relevancy. Instead, from the user’s perspective it is
the interface through which data is accessed that is legally regulated, such as digitized
money or other non-physical monetary rights. Both may be stored in one format, such as
binary numbers that signifies a sum of money at a bank account, or a check legal
obligation that is given in oral – but then accounted for per their interfacial appearance,
which may then support functional discontinuity. In cyberspace, that interactive level of
accessibility may, in fact, create a functional sense of distinguishable "placeness" that
meetings in Cyberspace may become a viable alternative to meetings in physical space.306
That is, regardless of the format and order in which information is stored. In a less than a
‘strict technological sense,’ legal truth already acknowledges that such normative
discontinuities do not have to be inclusive in the cognitive sense; in fact, they can be
fictional.
There are however, a few indications that a shift toward localist boundary recognition of
virtual discontinuity is at reach. As recently as 1997, the Supreme Court acknowledged
"that the creation of such [adult] zones can be constitutionally sound”307 Instead of
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Little v. Winborn, Supreme Court of Iowa (1994) 518 N.W. 2d 384, referring to Jaffe v. City of
Davenport, 179 N.W. 2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1970). See, also, 8 E. McQuillen, Municipal
Corporations § 25.84, at 319 (3rd ed. Rev. 1991).
Little v. Winborn, Supreme Court of Iowa, Determining whether there is a reasonable basis for
spot zoning, typically entails the consideration of the size of the spot zoned, the uses of the
surrounding property, the changing conditions of the larger space, the use to which the subject
property has been put and its suitability and adaptability for various uses, Id
Katz v. United States, supra note 41, Id.
Benitez v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
See, I. Trotter Hardy, Electronic Conferences: The Report of an Experiment, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
213, 232-34 (1993) (discussing the advantages of e-mail conferences) (Fn. 30) [Hereinafter,
‘Hardy, Electronic Conferences’].
See, Reno v. ACLU, supra note 61, at 2354.
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relaxing the discontinuous localist spatial analogy with the prevailing technocentristic
globalist types of argumentation that tell us that geography, ultimately, implies both
discrete locales and an ability to map their organization in either relation to the physical
world or in separation from it - the court understood that discontinuous zoning is more
possible in Cyberspace than in other media, without adhering to a spatial relationship
between all locales. That is, even in the midst of what the court identified as
technological uncertainty concerning future zoning abilities, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence suggested that the Court was sensitive not only to how the Internet differed
from any of the existing media offered as analogies at the present time,308 but also to how
the nature of the Internet might change over time in ways that affected its regulability.309
Almost anecdotally, recognition of the homogenous weakness concerning continuity,
ultimately, can be found within Johnson and Post’s globalist argument. In fact, less
attention has thus far given to the fact that Johnson & Post’s boundary approach,
normatively accepts the possibility of inner bordering within distinct Cyberspace locales
(or “constellations”310 or “areas”311).312 Each such virtual locale, as they normatively
agree, could then likely develop its own set of distinct rules.313 Thus, as localist boundary
theory predicts, conduct acceptable in one locale of cyberspace could then be fenced-out
by another.314 Albeit, once again, based on a technocentristic approach, in due course, so
does Johnson & Post’s approach could succumb to the prospect of localist discontinuity
as much as technology allows.315 Thus, at least normatively, even Johnson and Post’s
strong globalist advocacy recognizes that localist heterogeneity in continuity could be
sustained.

b)
1)

Drawn from available evidence
Physical distance: Remote access

A second weakness of the homogenous definition of space according to globalist
boundary theoreticians is threatened by heterogeneity due to the existence of distance316
308
309
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314
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Id, at 889-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id, at 890 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Lawrence Lessig, supra note 68, at 886-89;
Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, supra note 72; O’Connor’s concurrence has been criticized as a
rote application of the cyberspace as place metaphor, however. See Josh A. Goldfoot, supra note
88, at 920-21.
Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379 and Fn. M92-96 and accompanying text.
Id.
In a conversation with David Post he further suggested that the ‘inner zoning’ argument should
have been understood as even more acute that the more cited ‘outer zoning separateness’ argument
vis-à-vis the physical world. (Interview with David Post 3/12/04). Post’s localist heterogeneous
clarification, however, remains in tension with his main argument that views cyberspace as a
global spatial system, regardless of its relation to the physical world spatiality.
Johnson & Post, supra note 59, at 1379.
Id, at 1379, 1396-1397.
In further continuation with localist theory, Johnson and Post accept that a primary function and
characteristic of such cyber borders or boundaries is its ability to be perceived by the one who
crosses it. See, Id, at 1379 and Fn. 33 & accompanying text.
Legal appliance of localist boundary theory to the concept of distance has, notably, given rise to
the concept of Frontiers. These are zones of varying depth, which marked either the political
division between two countries or the division between the settled and uninhabited areas within a
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and its influence on entry preferences on individuals.317 The presence of distance then
assumes proportional proximity between locales, which then supports the preferences of
either entering a given locale or otherwise observing it remotely.318 Scientific truism
rejects the soundness of these localist boundary theory propositions for cyberspace on
several levels. Firstly, we are told, whereas a physical locale assumes ability to enter it,
network environments are said not to have that ability, as entering a web site is physically
impossible. Instead, we are told, only a replacement of data exists.319 As Lemley allpurposely suggests, courts have not understood that no one “enters” Web sites.320 Instead,
relevant on-line trespass cases’ defendants merely send request for information to a web
server, which the plaintiff had made open to the public, and the plaintiff’s own server
sends information in return.321 Lemley further argues that the technological ability to
sustain simultaneous usage through both multiple presences by one individual in various
locales and multiple presences by various individuals in one locale – is unique to network
environments and as such entails further spatial disparity from the physical world’s
spatial analysis. To begin with, multiple entries/entrants is said to diminish the stability of
locations.322 In addition, it is said to override passage scarcity, as for on-line
communications purposes bandwidth is effectively infinite.323 Secondly, in network
environment observance is said to be impossible, as it lacks the concept of proportional
proximity or “next door”.324 Thus, as scientific truism argues, there can be no nonmaterial public locales, such as streets or sidewalks, from which to observe on either
public or private spheres could be made possible.325
Analyzing localist boundary theory as legal truth may, however, lead us to different
instrumental conclusions. In the absolute fictional sense in consideration of territorial
privacy, as Robert Post points out, privacy "cannot be reduced to objective facts like
spatial distance or information or observance; it can only be understood by reference to
norms of behavior."326 Arguably, in the present case, scientific truism actually can be
overcome partly from within cognition itself, as will be explained herein, so that the use
of fiction not even indispensable. In the following regard it is the case that in some cases
country. J.R.V. Prescott, Political geography, supra note 105, at 54, 56-61; Suzanne Lalonde,
Determining boundaries in a conflicted world (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), at 8 and
mentioned sources; L.K.D Kristof, The nature of frontiers and bounadies, In R.E. Kasperson &
J.V. Minghi (eds.), The structure of political geography (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 127. Frontiers
are of less importance to network environments, as will be explained herein.
317
J.R.V. Prescott, supra note 105, at 54, 56-61; Suzanne Lalonde, supra note 124, at 8 and
mentioned sources; L.K.D Kristof, supra note 124, at 127.
318
Id.
319
Mark Lemley, supra note 43, Id; Shapiro, The Disappearance, at 710.
320
Id. See, also, See, Joseph M. Olivenbaum, Rethinking Federal Computer Crime Legislation, 27
Seton Hall L. Rev. 574 (1997), at 577.
321
Mark Lemley, Id.
322
Id, at 526.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 969 (1989). See, also, Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy,
supra note 9, at 1129.
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legal fictions-far from being merely the metaphorical expressions of “norms” – are in fact
tentative expressions of scientific truths, backed by legal values, to be discovered by the
courts in their struggle to rationalize the subject matters presented to them.327 Based on a
conventional framework of legal fiction of on-line locales, an applied localist boundary
theory for cyberspace could then aggregately support the existence of heterogeneity due
to the existence of distance and its influence on entry preferences on individuals. That is,
for reasons deriving from an analogy to the physical world’s remote access and the added
reverse remote access nature of cyberspace.
To begin with, in comparing non-physical electronic access to physical access there is
still a sufficient level of scientific truth analogy that could permit us to overcome the
obstacle set by this argument, in two levels. Firstly, the existence of non-physical entry
should not be seen unique to network environments, and should be legally analogized to
physical environments. In the latter, the requirement of actual trespass was largely
abandoned with the tort of privacy intrusion.328 Thus, the requirement of a tangible
entrance has been relaxed almost to the point of being discarded. Thus, for example, a
single shot over private property was seen as trespass,329 and in different circumstances
parents were liable to long-distance telephone company for trespass to personal property
arising from their sons' unauthorized use of confidential codes to gain computer access to
a company's system.330 Other courts have held that microscopic particles331 or smoke332
may give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated migrating
intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass.333 More relevant to cyberspace’s
digital setting was the precedent upholding that electronic signals were sufficiently
tangible to support a trespass cause of action.334 Trespass analysis was not the only way
through which Courts have overcome the physical presence and entry requirements.
Thus, in a constituting set of Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) jurisdictional cases, as
in the case of Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,335 the court has
upheld that even a reaction up and down the line by a signal or a chain reaction is, in
essence, electricity moving in interstate commerce.336 The Federal Power Commission
327
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Dean Pound, supra note 161, at 132.
Nevertheless, there are still some jurisdictions that still require actual trespass by the defendant
See, e.g., Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (holding a
single shot across private property is a trespass); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331-32 (Mont.
1925) (holding that defendant while standing on another's property, committed a trespass when he
fired a shotgun over plaintiff's premises).
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra note 213, Id.
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782, 788-789.
Ream v. Keen (1992) 314 Or. 370, 838 P.2d 1073, 1075.
Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal.3d at pp. 233-234, 185 Cal.Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 922.
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra note 213, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 Cal.App.4.Dist., 1996. See, also,
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., SUPRA NOTE 213, at 1021 (stating that electronic
signals or messages provide sufficient contact to give rise to action for trespass to chattels).
See, supra note 135, Id.
Id, at 458. See, also, Section 201 of the Federal Power Act owes its origin to the determination of
this Court that a direct transfer of power from a utility in Rhode Island to a utility in
Massachusetts is in interstate commerce, Id, at 458. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro
Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549 (1927). 'Part II (of the Act) is a
direct result of Attleboro.' United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345 U.S. 295,
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court further argued, that no matter how small the quantity of the electromagnetic
response, FPC jurisdiction will attach because it is settled that Congress has not
'conditioned the jurisdiction of the Commission upon any particular volume or proportion
of interstate energy involved, and we do not . . . supply such a jurisdictional limitation by
construction.'337 Where previously the tort often required the tortfeasor's presence in the
private space, the proposal allows the presence requirement to be fulfilled virtually,
potentially expanding the tort of unreasonable intrusion to include peering into private
locales by the gathering of information by private persons using sense-enhancing tools.
In part, the tort of privacy intrusion may involve a purely sensory invasion by observing
that an intrusion may be committed "by the use of the defendant's senses, with or without
mechanical aids”338, used to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, such as by
looking into her upstairs windows with binoculars.339 Thus, when a picture is taken of a
plaintiff while she is in the privacy of her home, the taking of the picture may be
considered an intrusion into the plaintiff's privacy just as remote eavesdropping or
looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars are considered an invasion of her
privacy.340 Overall, most courts today do not require the physical penetration of private
locales as an ingredient of spatial invasion of privacy. Wiretapping, bugging rooms with
microphones and peering into windows have all been held to constitute actionable
intrusions.341 Based on several updates and expansions of the Wiretap Act, the ECPA, in
fact, expanded the protection of privacy against remote access from wire communications
also to electronic communications from unauthorized interception, use and disclosure. 342
Whenever taking a picture or taping someone may sometimes have captured the data
subject’s privacy inside her locale by importing its content ours, assuming that we
remained in ours in the first place. Still, we say that even without leaving our locale and
only by the fact that we have captured data from another locale, without being there – we
have intruded privacy by “uploading” that captured data to our locale. In comparison with
the physical world, arguably, the right analogy to network environments should be with
remote access instead of direct access, as in some analogous physical environments.
Such is the case with surveillance into a private locale from a public one, where invasion
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311, 73 S.Ct. 706, 715, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S.
515, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150 (1945).
Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co., Id, at 461. See, also, Connecticut Ligh
& Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 536, 65 S.Ct. 749, 759. See also Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 72 S.Ct. 843, 96 L.Ed. 1042 (1952).
See, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 14, § 652B, Comment (b).
Id.
86 A.L.R.3d 374, supra note 16, § 3(A).
See, W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 15, § 117, at 854-55 (citing cases); See, Id. Some states
have chosen to promote specialized types of privacy through targeted Anti-Paparazzi laws. See,
e.g., California's anti paparazzi statute Cal. Civ. Code. § 1708.8(b) (West 1999).
Electronic communications differ from wire communications in that they are communications that
are not transmitted by sound waves and cannot be characterized as containing a human voice.
Instead, they include telegraph, telex communications, electronic mail, nonvoice digitized
transmissions, and the portion of video teleconferences that do not involve the hearing of voice or
oral sounds. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988), supra note 23, Id.
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of privacy is done by technical surveillance that allows identification of a privacy subject
matter.343 Cyberspace territorial privacy may arguably support an analogous proposition.
Alternatively, remote access can be made legitimate and thus has no intrinsic normative
value, such as in the case of legitimate remote access from a private locale into a public
one, where for instance, a naked woman is been observed with the use of binoculars and
then identified while bathing at a public beach. In both types of activities, remote access
is seen sufficient to define liability, without remote access to spheres carrying physical
presence or an intrinsic normative value per se. This interpretative rule also logically
overcomes the separate scientific truisms’ claim concerning multiple usages through both
multiple presences by one individual in various locales and multiple presences by various
individuals to one locale. Multiple usage as either static presence or entry is, therefore,
not unique to of network environments. It should, accordingly, not remain an obstacle in
the sustainability of non-physical entry per se in non-physical environments, such as
cyberspace.
In essence, the concept of territorial privacy is employed to govern the conduct of
individuals who intrude in various ways upon one's life on-line. Privacy in these nonphysical contexts can be generally understood in its familiar informational sense;344 it
limits the ability of others to gain, disseminate, or use information about oneself.345 Like
in the physical world, in cyberspace, any gateway technology that would be seen as a
public locale would avoid the risk of such illegal intrusion to whichever Internet user who
will decide to enter it upon primer notice and choice to do so. Otherwise, for private
locales on-line, namely – private proprietary web sites that would be acknowledged as
such, intrusion into a user’s private affairs would be seemed illegally intrusive.

2)

Non-physical distance: Reverse remote access

Secondly, and more specifically, this scientific truisms’ argument can be mitigated by the
unique nature of network environments per se. Whereas in the physical world the
embedded assumption for any proof of the occurrence of entry is the space-shifting of
relevant individuals through direct access, and only alternatively through remote access –
a more particular type of space-shifting should be admitted in relation to cyberspace,
namely reverse remote access. Technically, when a user clicks on a link, the user's
computer sends a request to the server on which the desired document resides. That
computer decides whether or not to respond favorably to the query.346 It honors the
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See, e.g., Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Miller v. Brooks,
472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. App. 1996); Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App. 2001).
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989), p. 740.
Id.
The collection of uncopyrighted identifiable data is not an act of unauthorized copying and would
not be subject to the preemption section. Moreover, the assumption of both a permissible access
and the use of temporary copyrighted ‘work of art’ files, in their meaning in the Copyright Act,
might override copyright preemption claims. In short, only when neither assumption applies in the
case of copyrighted information, would the Copyright Act be the exclusive rule of decision under
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request by sending a copy of the document to the user's computer, while the original
remains on its server. In other words, the user who clicks on a link starts a chain of events
that uses resources of either her system and those of the linked system. Commentators
sometimes refer to this process as employing "pull" technology: The user "pulls" a copy
of desired content from the linked site rather than having that site's server "push" content
indiscriminately to the user who may or may not be interested in it.347 This type of
information transaction from a given on-line locale to a user’s computer may
allegorically remind us of the popular Arab idiom, suggesting “If Muhammad cannot go
to the mountain, let the mountain come to Muhammad”. In both cases, space-shifting
should then be considered functionally (and to some also theologically) appealing. Thus,
whenever access to a given web page is made, an ISP sends the content of the requested
data to the requesting user, and allows the latter to copy the content of that page as a
temporary file.348 Thus, instead of users moving between locales remotely, the locales
move between the users remotely, and information gathering is done, therefore, in the
opposite order, but nevertheless remotely. As a result, allowing users to search for and
retrieve of information stored in remote computers, as was also acknowledged as obiter
dictum by the Reno v. ACLU court.349 Once the physical space-shifting requirement is
inherently removed, remote access should be acknowledged in either direction. Only, as
explained, in cyberspace access is made remotely but in the opposite direction; or
otherwise, intrusion into our computers and observance of our digitized identities is
practiced by locales, or some electronic parts of it, upon our earlier request.
Thirdly, it should be reminded that the tort of intrusion only imposes liability for the use
of one's senses if that person is using them in locales where she should not be.
Eavesdropping, for instance, is thus allowed in a public locale. In Nader v. General
Motors350 the Court stated that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public locale
does not amount to an invasion of the data subject’s privacy."351 As comment c to § 652B
of the Restatement explains, a person who moves about in a public locale has emerged
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its preemption section. See, also, I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites,
1996 J. Online L. art. 7, §§ 10, 3.
Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1148 (2000) (explaining that surfing the Web is
a common example of pull technology); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, Bidder's
Edge, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-15995) (9th Cir. filed
June 22, 2000) (discussing "pull" technology and noting that "servers on the Internet are passive
and do not deliver information to a consumer's computer unless that information is requested").
The author provided comments on and signed this brief in support of Bidder's Edge, Inc. She
received no compensation for this activity.
Storing a Web page in a cache constitutes copying. See, also, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Advanced Computer Services v. MA Systems
Corp., 845 F.Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). See, also, Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia Ann
Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 Stan L &
Policy Rev 25 (1994), p. 32 et al.
See, generally, ACLU v. Reno, supra note 61, at 834-36 (specifying remote information retrieval
as one of the common methods of communication on the Internet).
See, 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
Id, at 771.
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from seclusion and thus opened herself up to observation by others.352 However, under
certain circumstances, surveillance may be so 'overzealous' as to render it actionable.353
Thus, this general principle should not be understood to mean that all things that transpire
in public are fair game for inquiry. In balance, as in the physical world, in the absence of
a purposeful effort by some entity or device to actually track the actions of a particular
individual, we would probably not consider social observation a form of monitoring.354
Thus, legitimate observation should not reveal information that people wish to hide.355
The court in Nader established that "[a] person does not automatically make public
everything he does merely by being in a public place."356 This conclusion should still be
held valid when entry is done non-physically, as in cyberspace; and any recognition of
remote entry should be done within this normative framework. In fact, in cyberspace, online anonymity is easily established and is relatively cheap to achieve. Moreover, just like
in the physical world, such identifiers are words or symbols, which identify a specific
person. Examples of identifiers in their meaning at the ECPA include Internet customer's
name, address, social security number, credit card number, and proof of Internet
connection obtained by Internet providers.357 As a result, observance and knowledge of a
person’s data identifiers - should remain a distinctive criterion in assessing privacy
invasion on-line, even after territorial privacy is successfully integrated into cyberspace’s
privacy jurisprudence.
More particularly, on-line territorial privacy also should not alter the explicit premise in
Dean Prosser's statement, adopted by the comments to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,358 that there is no difference between merely observing a person in a public locale
and taking her photograph. Thus, in correspondence to the physical world, activities like
wiretapping and broadcasting without identifying, based on material that was gathered in
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Upheld also in, Dickson v. American Red Cross Nat. Headquartes, 1997 WL 118415,
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a public locale should not amount to intrusion upon seclusion.359 That legal framework
should now also legitimize on -line non-identifiable data collection, for purposes such as
for research on socio-economical trends or the development of statistics found in public
locales, either through real time observance or ‘sensor technology’ or just occasional
observance of user’s behavior in on-line public locales.360
Even more so, like in the physical world, mere observation and/or legitimate data
collecting should then be legalized notwithstanding if the collection of observed data was
made for commercial use or not. The physical world’s law already admits such
circumstances. For example, in the case of Deteresa v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.361 Court upheld that under California law, a television producer's
conduct in arranging for surreptitious videotaping of a woman in public view by camera
person in public place, and in broadcasting only a five-second clip of tape, without
broadcasting the woman's name or address, had insubstantial impact on privacy interests,
and would not support the woman's intrusion into a seclusion privacy claim.362
Accordingly, it is uniformly held that the use of a photograph of a person's property does
not constitute an invasion of that person's privacy justifying recovery unless that person's
identity is apparent from the photograph.363 In other words, invasion of privacy by taking
someone’s picture, even for commercial use, is possible unless the picture tells the
person’s identity.364 Such as when a photograph of her property has been used by the
defendant in an advertisement, the plaintiff's identity must be apparent in the photograph.

2.
a.

Phrased in realistic terms
Implicit individual consent

Within localist boundary theory, recognition of a distinct legal status of locales requires
that individual consent and cost of control should match the particular functions on the
whole sub segment of types of locations, namely private and public. A legal fiction of online locales can arguably be easily phrased in realistic terms in compliance with both
conditions. For a start, it could allow individual implied consent to on-line data
collection. In public locales, Dean Prosser's conclusion that there can be no intrusion in a
public locale depends upon the acceptance of two supporting premises, one implicit and
one explicit. The implicit premise is that one assumes the risk of public inspection when
she ventures into a public place.365 This assumption of risk analysis is clearly discernible
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in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,366 a famous privacy case relied upon by Dean Prosser as
support for his comments regarding absence of privacy in public locales.367 The court
grounded much of its reasoning in a kind of assumption of risk analysis, commenting that
the plaintiffs were "in a pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place";368 that they
"had voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the view of any
persons who might then be at or near their place of business";369 that "[b]y their own
voluntary action plaintiffs waived their right of privacy so far as this particular public
pose was assumed";370 and that the plaintiffs' right of privacy ceased by "their own
voluntary assumption of this particular pose in a public place."371
In private locales, however, as the Restatement provision initially recognizes, to find true
consent, the plaintiff must have full knowledge of the risk and voluntarily choose to
encounter it. For an Internet customer to have reasonable expectation of privacy in her
personal information under risk-analysis approach to Fourth Amendment:372 (1) data
must not be knowingly exposed to others,373 and (2) Internet service provider's ability to
access data must not constitute disclosure.374 That expectation of privacy, as explained,
can be applied to private locales intruded by private data collectors. Moreover, like in the
physical world, when an on-line business is available to the public, a would-be entrant to
the on-line locale in a given web site, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner,
would have the implied consent of the owner to be there, and so long as the person
engages in no acts inconsistent with the purposes of the business or locale, there would be
no trespass.375
Practically, should the courts choose this path based on on-line territorial privacy and the
following construction of on-line locales, affected website owners would be prohibited
from freely disclosing their members' identities on the one hand, and relieved from the
need to attest contractual consent in both types of locales and, arguably, should only be
required to give adequate notice. As already acknowledged by the FTC, the notion that
choice should be respected is almost universally accepted as a starting point for practical
reasoning for privacy regulation.376 Such an invitation, however, presupposes that the

366
367
368
369
370
371
372

373
374
375

376

See, 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
Prosser, supra note 9, at 391 n.81.
Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 342, at 444.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Assumption of risk is then an affirmative defense that could be used by data collectors in
cyberspace to claims based upon negligent or reckless conduct of their part. See, Restatement
(Second) of Torts , supra note 14, sec. 496A.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Id, § 496C(1).
See Mosher v. Cook United, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 720, 721 (Ohio 1980) (labeling a comparison price
shopper a "business invitee" subject to the property owner's right to revoke the shopper's license at
will); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass §48 (1989 & Supp. 2000).
Gavison, supra note 1, p. 441; The FTC has interpreted the norm of choice so as to include making
a choice among a number of alternatives. See, FTC, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (1998),
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf>, at 17.
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conduct of would-be entrants will be in keeping with the nature of the locale.377 In a
zoned cyberspace, boundaries would, then, serve as signposts that provide warning that
we will be required, after crossing, to abide by different privacy rules. Thus, a link to a
notification about information collection or a built-in disclaimer into the website’s locale,
or several locales, would have to appear in response to every search or directory listing
that included the target. It would also have to attract the attention of a user seeking a
specific address out of a potentially long list of related sites. Thus, all that would actually
be required is the insertion of a command into the Web page that opens a page
maintained by the access-seeker on her own server as a separate window or built-in
disclaimer into the website’s locale or several locales, in the visitor's browser.378
Like with other precise legal fictions, the risk of over inclusive distinction between
locales through the simple measurement of disclaimers therefore may entail a regulatory
paradox. The more it continues to strive to grasp and define the essence of a legal
proposition, such as the existence of on line spatiality, the farther we may get to promote
its declared legal purposes. Courts should initially confine themselves to determining
whether the law and justice require or permit a change in the status quo. To decide, courts
should look to what practices, policies, procedures, and agreements exist in the locale that
may or may not create a reasonable and legally enforceable expectation of privacy.379 In
information privacy cases, in analogy, courts have found that when employees used a
lock, password, or encryption to protect certain items, that action created an “expectation
of privacy” that could be violated when companies break the lock, password or
encryption.380 A similar comparison could be made by courts to territorial privacy with
users act to hide non-identifiable data upon entry to public locales. Upon entry to private
locales, moreover, website owners may legitimize their collection activities, upon notice,
clarifying that the web site owner collecting such data may override identity concealment
measurements used by would-be entrants to such locales.381

b. Proportional cost of control
Recognition of distinct locales also requires that the cost of control should match the
particular functions on the whole sub segment of types of locations, namely private and
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public. Based on information privacy analysis, the legal problem has been likely to be
detection of "trespasses" or the unauthorized use of an informational work.382 As noted
earlier, practical problems exist with policing very long borders of real property, but they
seem to pale beside the problem of detecting "trespass" activities like unauthorized
copying or uses of informational works.383 If these costs are excessive in cyberspace, they
might argue against a private-property regime because such a regime would not be
"worth it".384
Based on an acknowledgment of territorial privacy, however, there should be a difference
between control over content use as assessed through information privacy protection, and
control over access. As explained, territorial privacy would only need to uphold sufficient
control over access. Even when control over access derives from ownership, the law
generally gives owners of real property the right to exclude others from entrance,
regardless of whether or not the intruder causes harm.385 Thus, the doctrine of trespass to
chattels traditionally required actual harm to the chattel, while trespass to land was
actionable whether or not the owner's interest in the land was injured.386 A similar
presumption to that of trespass to land, however, exists in case of privacy invasion
according to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Invasion is intrinsically foul, even with
no harm, as it is an “interference tort”, as opposed to a “damage tort” where the proof of
harm is necessary following the proposition of "no harm, no foul."' Gavison further
argues that in terms of social norms, privacy "is simply a conclusion, not a tool to analyze
whether a certain invasion should be considered wrong in the first place."387 In other
words, an intrusion on privacy is intrinsically harmful because it is defined as that which
injures social personality.388 Thus, the tort of invasion of territorial privacy is
qualitatively similar because the injury at issue is logically entailed, rather than merely
contingently caused, by improper conduct.389
In contrast to the usual cause of action for negligence, this privacy tort enables a plaintiff
to make out her case without alleging or proving any actual or contingent injury, such as
emotional suffering or embarrassment.390 With this lowered standard of proof of
infringing behavior, and by analogy, website owners should have the right to exclude
others from gaining access to their information on a territorial basis, even if their entry
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does not harm the site in any way.391 Consequently, privacy norms against intrusion
could be more upheld in cyberspace, especially given the fact that surveillance
technology only makes illegal collection of information easier and cheaper to attain.
Notably, in tort law, full level of control by owners is only required in private locales.
Alternatively, any lack of sufficient level of actual control does not negate the concept of
spatiality at large, but rather only the possibility that such locale may be constituted as a
private one. Like in physical world jurisprudence, virtual spatiality framed as public, may
still be upheld.392 In such cases, the legal standard for spatiality could still constitute an
on-line public locale, just like in the physical world.

3.
a)
b)

The presumption has to be either
Conclusive, or
Freely rebuttable

Presumptions or legal fictions of on-line locales can be made either conclusive or
rebuttable. First, and proper to the legal fiction of on-line locales, they should be made
conclusive presumptions, which are actually a substantive rule of law.393 Conceptually,
following Gray’s classification scheme of legal fictions, borrowed from Ihering, legal
fictions, in fact, are broken down into "historic," or procedural, fictions and "dogmatic"
fictions.394 Accordingly, dogmatic fictions should never be used, as the historic fictions
were used in the past, to change the law, but only for the purpose of classifying
established rules, such as the existing private/public distinction between locales in the
physical world. In that regard, the legal fiction of on-line locales should merely be
regarded applicative and a direct and inevitable continuation of locales in the physical
world. One should, consequently, be able to state the real doctrine for which they
stand.395 Ultimately, the legal necessity for an adequate technical vocabulary makes it
desirable that well-founded fictions such as, arguably, on-line locales – converted into
legal truth, would be picked with appropriate judicial discretion.396
Regulators should be attentive to the reality that like other legal fictions, on-line locales
are founded in part upon exceptionally strong and visible policies, which have been said
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to persist despite proof rebutting their factual basis.397 That is also why the other type of
presumption, namely – the rebuttable presumption should not be preferred in the
construction of on-line locales. Rebuttable presumptions are instead, rules of law that
attach to proven evidentiary facts and certain procedural consequences as to the
opponent’s duty to come forward with other evidence.398 As explained, communication
mediums such as cyberspace are not susceptible to the possibility of rebutting physical
spatiality, as such is not assumed to be present in the first place. As a result, on-line
locales should not be seen as an “inference”, or dissimilarity, which is subtle but not
unreal. As unreal constructions, on-line locales are not a conclusion which the [trier of
fact] is permitted, but not compelled, to draw from the facts.”399 Instead, as real
presumptions, also called presumptions of law, on line locales should be made an
inference, through which the law directs the [trier of fact] to functionally draw if it finds a
given set of justifications, as explained. The content of such on-line locales would then
serve policy makers to specifically distinguish on-line public locales from the present
unbalanced default mosaic of on-line private allotments. Public locales could then be held
conclusive for newsgroups,400 in pre-print archives of articles enabling scientists to share
the latest learning in their fields,401 web resources on the poster's favorite topic,402 etc.
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VI.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thus far, cyberspace has not been left with a public sphere and locales, nor has a
balanced privacy policy been established. Instead, only a private, and too wide, privacy
legal rule has been adopted. Thus, database protection against the various forms of
information collection, but particularly registration data that is collected upon initial entry
to databases, is arguably an overly generalized privacy category. It includes both possible
public and private on-line locales, while overly protecting the former.
This study shows that notwithstanding information or database privacy jurisprudence,
territorial privacy and private and public locales, more specifically, could coexist on the
Internet, just as they do in the physical world. In continuation to previous jurisprudential
developments, privacy should continue to be valued instrumentally. Courts may then be
required to differentiate and identify private locales and then fence them out from public
ones. Thus, a legal fiction of on-line locales should now be constructed for cyberspace’s
overall privacy policy.403
In public locales, privacy protection should instead be balanced with protecting legitimate
observance and non-identifiable data collection either directly (collecting registration and
transactional data) or indirectly (collecting clickstream data) by websites. Notably, with
regard to databases, much information collection and use, occurs in what would
otherwise be considered public, and as argued, many parts of cyberspace may well be
considered public locales. In balance, adaptation of ECPA’s “in storage” definition in
Title II, primarily, to territorial privacy would then enhance the protection given to
information collected in private locales.
Moreover, database protection falls short in applying information privacy whenever an
otherwise potential locale would include multiple databases. Identifying such databases
as private or public locales, therefore, also may avoid over fragmentation of these
regulatory subject matters. Indeed, for the physical world, courts accepted claims
involving territorial intrusion whenever the category of privacy that would likely be
infringed was made in databases and would therefore belong to the category of
information privacy.
In cyberspace, nonetheless, the U.S. federal government and primarily the FTC’s privacy
policy, in fact, still encourages the withdrawal of law as a balancing constraint, as seen
with the FTC's stance toward online privacy, which emphasizes technological and market
self-regulation jointly, for the adoption of privacy policies. As shown, however,
technology alone thus far, has failed to provide protection comparable to that, which
could be provided with the intervention of law. Technology, thus fat, has been incapable
of establishing a comprehensive boundary solution only by itself.
403
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A legal fiction of on-line locales, in balance, can arguably be easily phrased in realistic
terms in compliance with all-purpose territorial privacy protection. For a start, it could
allow individual implied consent to on-line data collection. That expectation of privacy,
as explained, can be further applied to private locales. Moreover, like in the physical
world, when an on-line business is open to the public, a would-be entrant to the on-line
locale in a given web site, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, would have
the implied consent of the owner to be there, and so long as the person engages in no acts
inconsistent with the purposes of the business or locale, there would be no illegal
intrusion.
More particularly, territorial privacy on-line should also not alter the explicit premise in
Prosser's statement, adopted by the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,404
that there is no difference between merely observing a person in a public locale and
taking her photograph. Thus, in correspondence with the physical world, activities like
wiretapping and broadcasting without identifying, based on material that was gathered in
a public locale should not amount to intrusion upon seclusion. As shown, that legal
framework should now also legitimize on-line non-identifiable data collection, for
purposes such as for research on trends or the development of statistics in public locales,
either through real time observance sensor-based technology or just occasional
observance of user’s behavior in public locales on-line.
Even more so, just like in the physical world, mere observation and/or legitimate data
collecting in on-line locales should then be seen legal notwithstanding if the collection of
observed data was made for commercial use or not. The physical world’s law already
admits such circumstances. As a practical matter, observance in private locales should be
replaced through a mechanism of voluntary disclosure of whichever types of information,
namely, transactional, registration and clickstream data, that would be abided to by
would-be entrants; in public locales, however, observance should be freely allowed, as
long as a notice of the public locale is brought forth, but then be solely restricted to the
collection of non-identifiable registration and clickstream data.
In balance, legitimate observation should not reveal data identifiers that people wish to
hide. Like in the physical world, such identifiers are words or symbols, which identify a
specific person. Examples of identifiers in their meaning at the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act include Internet customer's name, address, social security
number, credit card number or proof of Internet connection obtained by Internet
providers. As a result, observance and knowledge of a person’s data identifiers - should
remain a distinctive criterion in assessing privacy invasion on-line, even after territorial
privacy is successfully integrated into cyberspace’s privacy jurisprudence. This
conclusion should still be held valid when entry is made non-physically, as in cyberspace;
and any recognition of remote entry should be evaluated within this normative
framework.
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Moreover, any lack of sufficient level of actual control should not negate the concept of
spatiality at large, but rather only the possibility that such spatial location may be
constituted as a private sphere. Notably, in tort law, full level of control by owners is only
required in the private sphere. Like in physical world jurisprudence, a lesser level of
control in virtual spatiality framed as a public sphere may still be upheld. In such cases,
the legal standard for spatiality could still constitute an on-line public sphere.
As real presumptions, also called presumptions of law, on line locales should be made an
inference, through which the law directs the [trier of fact] to functionally draw if it finds a
given set of justifications, as explained. The content of such locales would serve policy
makers to specifically distinguish public locales from the present unbalanced default
mosaic of on-line private allotments.
Like in the physical world, ultimately, on-line public locales will finally legitimize the
supervision of public health, a territorially based collection of taxes, the enforcement of
the criminal and First Amendment policies and even the possible use of copyrighted
information distributed through the public sphere. That is, either if ownership of public
locales is public, private or a combination of the two.
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